Plovett has it right I suggest.
It would be useful around about now to get away from the emotion, myth and rhetoric in the “hours” debate and have develop this discussion into an arena for those with varying experiences to share their history and stories.
Good for us all to hear experiences of those who have flown with low hour F/Os on jets. The good and the bad.
I was a cadet, going onto the F27 with only 200 hours. I only had about 4500 hrs when I got my command, barely 100 actual PIC by myself (in singles) but I had been through years of a good check and training system and probably 2000 sectors, of which I would have flown half.
I later flew with very low time F/Os in demanding short-medium haul European routes and then again with an Asian carrier on short haul routes with former cadet F/Os. Yes it was almost single pilot IFR in lots of ways but they were well trained and learned fast. It’s a challenge briefing the young guy in the RHS about the forthcoming descent to 700 ft minimums then the night circling approach in drifting snow and mist, but if he is well selected and well trained to listen and learn with solid SOPs rusted on, then it’s a great learning time at very very adequate standards. I would rather have a well-trained former cadet than an ex-fighter pilot with his own agenda and knowing it all.
(Must say in passing that doing 40-50 sectors a month in very challenging conditions, arctic winters, monsoon summers, short haul and lots of military traffic is good for the soul and for training. I learned far more there about being a PIC than ever before and certainly an hour in that world is worth 10 of those I spent in cruise in my beloved 777 over the night skies of the Pacific).
A young Sherm on the F27 heard many stories about the hiring profiles of the Captains he flew with. Not a few stories about rapid hiring phases where pilots went from low hour instructors on the Chipmunk to Viscount or DC-4 F/Os. The key then, as now, was the quality of training on both seats. I remember that the then Chief Check and Training Captain, Frank Fischer (any like him left?) said that they had done research into hiring profiles and found that it really didn’t matter what your background and experience was, after 8 years with the airline pretty much everyone would be at the same standard. And that was with simulators far less capable than now, before LOFT and CRM, and probably only 2-300 sectors a year.
The point I am trying to make is that Plovett is right: we should separate the quality of the training (in the left seat as well as the right) from the simple issue of hours. If the training is good then hours in the RHS are far less relevant. If not, yes, problems will come inevitably. If pilots get promoted into the LHS with too few sectors or too little training (and it’s sectors that count for a new A320 or 737 Captain, not hours) then there will be problems.
All the "hours in the cockpit matter when something goes wrong" anecdotes don't mean much. The "hours" didn't help stop the hull loss (ish) of the Qantas 744 at Bangkok, the 737 that came within minutes of running out of fuel, the 737 nearly lost flying an approach into a microburst at BNE, the A330 that nearly ran out of gas trying endlessly to get into foggy SYD. Every airline has such stories and good airlines learn from them and train for avoidance in future. How many hours were in the cockpit in two eminently avoidable horrific accidents, KLM at Teneriffe, Air France at Toronto?
Training-and all that goes with it is what matters: and "what matters" includes good management, generous fuel policy and few MELs, good CRM/TEM training and practice, good FOQA system, quality SMS, confidential self-reporting, "Just" culture in practice, not just theory.
Be good to hear the paths travelled and experiences of others before we too quickly get a bandwagon going that is contrary to the way many leading world airlines operate, and quite successfully.