Yes, it would have been very sensible to have introduced a attention getter / warning set for the revised, lower, pressure threshold for 'Land Immediately'. It makes no sense to have to 'keep an eye' on a small pressure gauge to detemine if you really have a catastrophic failure mode.
The failure to so was probably Sikorsky's
Ford Pinto moment, the case were dangerous design features were left uncorrected because the "company is run by salesmen, not engineers" and the priority was sales, not safety.
In one study of the Pinto it is reported that a meeting was called on the subject:
When time came for the meeting, a grand total of two people showed up... "So you see," continued the anonymous Ford engineer ironically, "there are a few of us here at Ford who are concerned about fire safety." He adds: "They are mostly engineers who have to study a lot of accident reports and look at pictures of burned people. But we don't talk about it much. It isn't a popular subject.
One wonders how much Sikorsky and FAA really considered the safety of the S-92A MGB
before certification, or were only interested in safety
after an accident (and as Broome was not an accident they didn't worry).
For more in the Pinto
see here
