SB:
4.68
Other security measures Part 4 On-board security Division 4.4
Regulation 4.68
Additional requirements for security of flight crew compartment — aircraft with seating capacity 30 or more
This regulation applies in relation to an aircraft operated for the purposes of a regular public transport operation or an open charter operation (in each case, whether a domestic or an international air service).
The operator of an aircraft that has a certificated maximum passenger seating capacity of 30 to 59 must not operate the aircraft unless the aircraft is equipped with a cockpit door that is:
(a) designed to resist forcible intrusion by unauthorised persons; and
(b) capable of withstanding impacts of at least 300 joules at critical locations; and
(c) capable of withstanding at least 1113 newtons constant tensile load on the knob or handle; and
(d) designed to resist penetration by small arms fire and fragementation devices to a level equivalent to level IIIa of the United States National Institute of Justice Standard (NIJ) 0101.04 Revision A, as in force on 15 January 2002.
Penalty: 50 penalty units.
The operator of an aircraft that has a certificated maximum passenger seating capacity of 60 or more must not operate the aircraft unless the aircraft is equipped with a cockpit door that complies with section 13.2.2 of Annex 6, Operation of Aircraft, to the Chicago Convention, as in force on 28 November 2002.
Penalty: 50 penalty units.
Note The section is as follows:
‘13.2.2 From 1 November 2003, all passenger-carrying aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass in excess of 45 500 kg or with a passenger seating capacity greater than 60 shall be equipped with an approved flight crew compartment door that is designed to resist penetration by small-arms fire and grenade shrapnel, and to resist forcible intrusions by unauthorized persons. This door shall be capable of being locked and unlocked from either pilot’s station.’.
Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005 179
How did they comply you ask?
Cynically, you could argue that they do, as the gap may stop bullets (big ones anyway... grenade shrapnel is more problematic... ) and it doesn't require a forceable entry to use a popsicle stick to slide a bolt out of the way... therefore is complies with the legal definition but not the intent. (now where have I heard that before?). CASA, shame on you. Engineers, there are still places in the world that value your abilities and integrity.
In relation to the overall pathology of management, it appears that Sunstate has taken some pointers from Qantas Management of old, the one that raises the following discussion between "the departed" and their lawyers...
"Hi, I am interested in information on ____'s, can you help me?"
"Worked for Qantas did you?".
Used to be a similar relationship with one particular company and Stop Orders...