Perspective?
Once upon a time, a USN F-4 experienced an electrical fire in the rear cockpit behind the C/B panels. The resulting arcing and sparking caused the AFCS (Stability Augmentation Portion) to experience intermittent electric power. The GIF (Guy in Front) experienced continuous transient control inputs as power was applied and removed from the AFCS. These inputs (and probably the smoke too) panicked him to such an extent that he promptly ejected out of an otherwise good flying machine without first addressing the electrical aspects of the rear cockpit fire. The GIB was also forced to eject since he had no controls in that cockpit.
Now this was an aircraft with essentially direct mechanical connection to the flight control hydraulic cylinders (The stab aug had limited control authority.)
Now forward to the 21st century. An AB aircraft experiences intermittent electrical power from a generator and that situation so confuses the electrical system that essential equipment is not continuously supplied with electrical power. The warning system itself (ECAM) has intermittant power and is continually being reset thus it doesn't settle down to display a clear warning message. Fortunately a clear warning message finally drifts across the screen and the crew responds and shuts down the left generator which begins the resolution of their problems.
But suppose the ECAM never settled down? How would this crew have addressed the problem then? Perhaps some memory item procedures are needed. If essential electrical systems are not continuously powered, does this still meet certification guidelines? Suppose a similar problem cropped up at rotation or on final.
And before all the B guys get too smug, ask yourselves what would happen in your machine if critical displays and systems continually were shuttled between busses by an intermittent electrical problem?