PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Airbus prepares safety warnings following A321 incident
Old 12th Nov 2010, 20:26
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MainDude
 
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Agreed! That worries me - I was hoping that deviant electrons fleeing a faulty GEN would automatically be trapped by at least one of the thousands of logic gates.

ECAM actions for GEN 1(2) FAULT usually calls for turning the GEN off then on again, and if it still doesn't work, turn it off & leave it. You loose the main galley and CATIII Dual - no big deal. No mention in the FCOM about what effects may be caused by a system that half works.

I'm curious though, if the crew followed the ECAM, they would have turned off GEN1 & kept if off if they knew it was faulty, unless the other faults e.g. side-stick fault jumped the queue (being more critical failures) thereby masking the real cause of their problems. Was it a condition with a remote possibility of reoccurrence, or is this an example of when the ECAM logic was inappropriate?

I really hope that this "deviation from design objectives" doesn't get swept away to OEB heaven, and that maybe just perhaps it will work it's way to the italic notes below the GEN 1 FAULT procedure in FCOM3.
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Oops, just read the link above and the report http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...0%20G-MEDJ.pdf
Riveting stuff.

Imagine this happens on an arrival or departure in a mountainous area. Can see the TRE's working this into the next sim check scenarios

Last edited by MainDude; 12th Nov 2010 at 20:52.
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