The problem is not necessarily automation. Aircraft have used autopilots for many years, apparently without the specific errors being highlighted.
The change (if real) appears to be associated with the use of modern technology; FMS and EFIS, and complex autoflight systems in modern aircraft.
More likely the problem involves several factors; e.g. a constraining operating environment, social and economic pressures, which demand greater use of technology and automation, and aspects of ‘modern’ human behaviour in operations (changes due to external influences).
It was reported that the much focussed-on ‘manual flying errors’ were only amongst other things, which involved inappropriate/incorrect inputs and responses, i.e. both proactive and reactive behaviour.
Comparing this with the conclusions in Orasanu and Martin (1) – errors arise from either an incorrect understanding of the situation resulting in the wrong choice of action, or with good understanding, the wrong action is chosen. In this, the behaviour has no direct relationship with either automation or manual flying, but situation awareness, knowledge, and decision making are significant contributors.
If training is to be reconsidered, which aspects should be addressed?
Pilots are still taught to fly the aircraft and use instruments. Have any aspects been removed or changed with the introduction of enhanced technology, if not, then the problem is more in the understanding and use of technology, or even the technology itsef; thus, poor knowledge and know-how relating to the technology make further contributions as might system design.
Many accidents evolved from automatic flight, and whilst the subsequent erroneous manual flight exacerbated the situation or prevented recovery, manual flight was not a direct contribution to the cause (origin) of the accident.
Thus calls for more manual flying, particularly on a clear day, are unlikely to improve flight skills in unusual circumstances. Upset recovery training is valuable for accident prevention, but only in a reactive capacity.
For proactive safety, the industry must understand the complex nature of the ‘automation’ problem, identify key issues, and then seek appropriate solutions. Calls for more manual flying, more flight hours, etc, could be an expensive overreaction (headless chicken) that fails to address the problem.
(1)
Errors in Aviation Decision Making.