A bit off the EROPS subject (apparent main thrust of this discourse) but...
Three quite mature airplanes and systems mentioned and yet fundamental flaws and deficiencies are emerging very late in the piece. You can understand the emergence of ravages of fatigue, fair wear and tear, commercial mods (SR-111's IFEN etc) plus corrosion over time, but it makes one wonder when innate and original system defects emerge. Admittedly some may be software induced but many are hardware related. When you look back in the SDR history (UA232 being an example), much was known about the particular defect over a lengthy period - yet nobody felt compelled to fix it. Safety action is locked into a reactive vice pro-active mentality.
Another recent example is the A380's RR engine and it's IP shaft's many known deficiencies. There'd been a number of failures of it before across a very limited fleet, yet repetitive inspection was the cop-out AD route taken. It's taken a very disruptive failure to force an expensive operator-initiated grounding action designed to stimulate action by Airbus/RR. Plaudits to QANTAS for doing the right thing. Kick-starting necessary action, no matter how unpalatable for the bottom line it may be, is never an easy course for number-crunchers.
If you look back over the SDR historicity you'll find that the examples given above have their precedents. Accepting that status quo for EROPS twins (flying thusly flawed) flies in the face of the underlying basis for having an exalted operating regime such as EROPS.
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