BOAC, re HS 748 accident, which the AAIB investigated and reported circumspectly – avoiding ‘error’ and blame.
I don’t have a problem with the Captains decision in the particular situation, but what about a shorter runway etc, etc. Nor do I have a problem with discarding standard procedures in ‘non standard’ conditions.
The HS748 accident suggests that the cues invoking surprise might not have been considered or realized in training – and perhaps not even possible for any aircraft type.
These are the areas that require improved RTO training. The Training Aid provides a range of situations and considerations but perhaps fails to provide adequate guidance on probabilities of occurrence and human behavior aspects.
The introduction/use of ‘if unsafe or unable to fly’ IMHO is detrimental to safety.
GlueBall touched on this (#4); it is unlikely that sufficiently reliable cues or time will be available for a decision. Environmental issues, i.e windshear, might be judged a failure in the decision to commence the take off, if so then we need to improve awareness and risk assessment. Similarly a truck or even an elephant on the runway (I’ve experienced one of those) is a real but low probability event, but again aspects which might be determined before V1 thus avoiding the possibility of rejecting ‘above V1’.
The report (#1) appears to identify problems with pilot’s inability/reluctance to change the decision/action process at V1. Perhaps because of poor speed awareness, or where correctly deciding to reject before V1, slow actions or incorrect technique result in an overrun; again, these are basic training issues.
However, IMHO the dominant issue is dealing with surprise – shock, even fear, an aspect which can be in most abnormal / emergency situations.
Thus, how do we train pilots to manage surprise?