Bis 47, a good analysis, but not ‘crew failure’ … … a deviation from expected behavior, the circumstances of which provide many safety lessons.
Expanding a few of your items:
they were not aware … auto trim. Apparently so, but the crew may not have considered that auto trim would/could be inop – poor knowledge, failure to consider alternatives, or failure to recall valid knowledge in the situation.
The systemic failure perhaps includes the lack of guidance on flight testing / system checking. Although AB had guidance would an operator have a copy – it would be prudent to request guidance.
Did the national authority have guidelines or even hard boundaries – the UK CAA did, perhaps these should be used by EASA.
The missing ‘flying’ skill was the ability to think about the test and issues which were to be checked; a TRI/TRE qualification or thousands of hours does not automatically infer an appropriate mode of thought – to see the bigger picture.
It’s not the skill in recovering from a post stall upset, it’s the skill of avoiding a stall or the post stall consequences which is important.
bearfoil provides a lustrous view of test pilots (#1503), but it is the provision and use of the skill set which aids safe operation. A tp’s ‘flying’ skills involve the same human thought processes as available to all pilots. These skills might be used more often and also in non-normal scenarios; tp’s are taught to think that way.
When and how are line pilots taught to think?