BBf, BOAC; Re HS748 Stanstead.
Read the AAIB report carefully, re decisions and actions (3/2001 (EW/C98/03/7)).
With hindsight, the decision was ‘incorrect’ (yet all decisions at the time are correct from the perspective of the decision maker), however the resultant fire from which a correct decision might be concluded, was perhaps exacerbated by other ‘erroneous behaviors’ in procedure.
Learning points from this accident are the power of startling or extreme graphic events to bias decision making, and that on balance a Go-Minded attitude (with correct engine shut down procedure) should provided a similar or higher level of safety than a decision to land straight ahead on a long runway.
In similar circumstances – a surprising event with a long runway ahead – another Captain related that he did not believe that the cues (noise and vibration from a thrown tyre tread) could be generated by a normal aircraft – hence the decision to a land ahead – surprise and incomprehension.
However, on a shorter runway the takeoff would have been continued, but no reasoning for the change could be offered.
This indicates the complexity of the decision making process, highly dependent on the perception of the situation in a time pressured environment, and bias – our predispositions towards particular actions (knowledge and understanding of risk – see the Training Aid).
I doubt that extensive simulator training would ever cover the range of scenarios, nor generate the requisite surprise; thus it might be more effective to practice the drills associated with stop or go in relation to V1, and as the Training Aid suggests, be Go minded – education and knowledge to dispel inappropriate bias.
In addition, from the report (#1), keep the decision choice to a simple ‘if – then’ option, which entails considering the reality and probability of operational scenarios – keep the SOPs practical.
Human judgment should still the best solution in ‘unforeseeable’ circumstances, and although we are ‘ground dwellers’, flying – like the birds – offers another dimension for safety, as well as more time (and longer runways) for the subsequent choice of action.