When fire fighting water does not cvool the fire out it turns to steam and the steam seperates the fire from oxygen. Foam more directly forms a physical barrier.
I see Boeing's notice came after the accident, a sign of a poorprior hazard analysis.
Airline culture is SO frustrating.
We agree it was a poor analysis. We differ in that I expect a hazard analysis to actually identify the hazards (fire - didn't your mother warn you of that one?) and put remedial mitigations in place. You don't seem to have an expectation of success.
You may have heard there is no smoke without fire. Well if there is a fire there is smoke and you need drills to deal with it.
The entire problem in the airline industry is most of you don't learn! You just dismiss the next accident as a surprise.
I think you are wrong and rather disparaging of Airline Culture and of Boeing's analysis.
Allow me to quote from a 747-400 QRH dated 1st October
2001 (Pax Version)
Later updates for the -400F and -400BCF have.........SET 25,000 FEET
And other minor differences
----------------------------------
FIRE CARGO
Message: FIRE CARGO FWD..........or..........FIRE CARGO AFT
-> LAND AT NEAREST SUITABLE AIRFIELD
-> (Gound Fire Procedures - not relevant here)
CARGO FIRE ARM SWITCH (FWD or AFT)...................ARM
* Pack 3 shuts down
PACK 3 CONTROL SELECTOR....................................OFF
PACK 1 or 2 CONTROL SELECTOR..............................OFF
* Maximum 1 pack on
CARGO FIRE DISCHARGE SWITCH............................PUSH
LANDING ALTITUDE SWITCH...................................MAN
LANDING ALTITUDE CONTROL..................SET 8,000 FEET
* Prevents penetration of smoke to cabin
* 195 minutes of fire suppression available
As you can see, the smoke problem has been thought about.
Boeing's latest words on the subject are a
reminder.
(Rather like the 737 Rad Alt reminder after Amsterdam)