LJ,
Many thanks for your points as well as the update on the latest iteration of MTs. I had previously been made aware of the list used for SDSR, hence my 09 timeline, but agree with you that the MRA4 could indeed fill all of the new ones in the maritime role. It is also interesting about the reprioritisation of tasks but I have to disagree that all the aircraft left in our depleted inventory are similarly capable of providing towards MT 2,3 and 4. And with the greying of definitions, if everything in the UK Armed forces cannot contribute to MT1,5,6 and 7 then clearly they shouldn’t be a part of it.
In response to the points you make: Your reasoning behind its cancellation due to cost is undoubtedly the most obvious, but after spending close on £4Bn already I am still not convinced the cancellation option is a more cost effective answer. And that is even before we start to unravel the true extent of the cancellation costs. The RTS issue is also quite emotive and all those close to the project know that this has undoubtedly been unduly influenced by the fall-out from the “Nimrod” handle as well as being the first in-production aircraft post the advent of MAA and so close to RTS. I could also find engineers who will give you a different take on the one forward and two back analogy. When goalposts are moved in mid-task then a reworking of estimates is the invariable result.
Your point about the camera not being as good as the MX-15 is correct; however, this platform was built for specific roles and overland was not one of them. Whilst the MR2 did a superb job in Iraq and Afghanistan, it was never the most cost effective or long term operationally sensible; hence it was only seen as an essential stop-gap until we could get something like Shadow to carry it forward. So to plan to place an MRA4 into this kind of overland operational environment from the outset would make no sense whatsoever. And I just don’t understand the one-trick pony MPA comment, especially when we have agreed it will fulfil all of the MTs in a maritime role.
I totally agree with your comment about HERRICK focus maybe impacting on the decision making process. However, I thought it was well understood that the MRA4 was never intended to participate in an overland OP that will end during this Govt’s term in office. SDSR was also supposed to look to the future protection of our Island Nation, so how does this decision stand up to inspection for the MTs 1 thru 7 in a maritime context? I have to admit that your last point is one I had not considered and is something that would have to be thrown into the strategic planning melting pot, but I would be amazed if the PM used this as the lever to cancel MRA4.
Yes we are skint but I am convinced that when CAS presented his options and analysis of risk to the MOD and Cabinet that the AFB cost-saving estimates must have added up. Furthermore, as CAS repeatedly tried to convince the PM that cancelling the MRA4 would be wrong then he must have had another preferred option on the table, what was it? Indeed this does appear to have been a very tough decision but I still maintain an incorrect and dangerous one that will be challenged in the future when this capability gap comes home to bite us.
Finally, thank you for your constructive criticism to my question and the interesting points you have raised.
Regards, DFM.