Looking at the decision from a completely agnostic viewpoint – I am retired now and have no axe to grind on future employment etc, I have the following points:
Cost was a clear driver, salami slicing would not achieve the aim so one Force had to go.
Harrier is the smaller and, arguably, less capable of the 2 when looking at all of the air-to-Ground roles required and ability to sustain force elements – Carrier Ops aside. Therefore, if one had to go the decision was almost made for them if they wanted to retain the maximum capability across the board until the arrival of JSF.
As to maintaining carrier capability. The wider ship’s company will always be difficult to maintain, I guess even now the RN believe they are losing the capability so perhaps we have to admit that it will take time to regain it in the future.
As to the aircrew, I have no first hand GR7/9 carrier Ops experience so admit my expertise is a bit thin on their flight deck operations, but I have flown a modern FW aircraft (well it was in service until about 5 years ago) from conventional carriers on exchange with the USN. From my viewpoint, apart from flying over water and hence having few divert opportunities, the Harrier operating procedures on and around the carrier were very different to that required for conventional aircraft ops. Therefore Harrier pilots would offer little expertise to the future JSF Force – indeed I saw some US Marine pilots having considerable difficulty transitioning to the conventional approach patterns and ‘ball’ landing techniques so perhaps the Harrier Force are the last people we should rely on.
On the other hand, the RN currently has ab-initio pilots training with USN F-18’s and this would seem the best place to grow our future capability, be it RAF or RN. Given the timeframe of JSF, we do not need to do it now, but perhaps aim to take slots in preparation for the first squadron.
Just a thought.
Lone Kestrel.