Agreed one is for fuel the other for hot air, but both conclude that the systems can not be declared ALARP.
As you posted yourself, they do not make specific assertions about the ALARP status of Nimrod. The first report was in some areas poorly worded, and when taken out of context it could be concluded that it did (which is what happened - the rest is history). The second report was obviously clearer in this respect to
avoid any such conclusion being drawn (it is ironic that despite such clarity it still fails to stop some trying to read too much into it though - as you appear to be doing).
Neither were the same as saying the ac is not ALARP.
Selectively quoting from reports out of context can be misleading - as you have proved above. It is quite possible for instance for a report to look in detail at a very specific part of an ac system, provide advice on risks and probabilities and not draw conclusions as to whether the aircraft it is installed in is safe. Such conclusiosn could vary depending on the application, and maybe down to a higher level analysis of ac architecture, systems and its operations, in the context of an overall safety target.
Still, its too late to learn about all this now - the damage is done, and the project is buried. Your contribution is noted however, and has been recorded for the TSR-2 type books that will no doubt rake over the coals of what went wrong. It may also feature in future training courses when looking for examples of Social factors when conducting PESTLE analysis.