Quote: Can we really justify a bespoke CHF? Seconded. CHF has been (apart from the odd amphibious exercise) a land-based SH force for the past twenty odd years.
How short (or selective) are some people's memories - GW1 (1991) GW2 - Al Faw assault? (2003) or maybe Sierra Leone (2000) So CHF should, by your reasoning, be sacrificed because we allowed ourselves, between amphibious OPS, and amphibious exercises, to stray ashore to assist the RM & Army?
It would be sad to see the end of the junglie ethos and spirit - but bigger sacrifices have already been made. Agreed, and dare I say it would be a significant loss to the UK's defence capability and to the RM and Army were it to go.
The FAA small-ships flights are an integral part of the ship's weapon systems and need naval aircrew - but that is not the case with CHF . CHF have striven to maintain an Amphibious capability over the last few years despite continuous Telic and Herrick commitment - The RAF would undoubtedly have had little interest in this were it holding the amphibious capability itself, lets face it, a certain service's RW units have routinely allowed themselves to go night uncurrent in the UK between Afghan tours - if they can't be trusted to maintain basic flying skills how can we expect them to maintain a complex Operational capability?
Whilst CHF is undoubtedly not at the peak of its ultimate amphibious capability, there is the depth of knowledge and the extensive background within the organization as well as the training that means that long periods of ops ashore, such as seen recently, do not jeopardise the amphibious piece as severely - the operational amphibious experience of the more senior a/c captains on CHF streaches back through Al Faw, Sierra Leone and beyond not to mention that of our engineers, chockheads and loggies - it's not just aircrew sh!t - its how the whole unit integrates, works with and understands the ship, how they understand and work with you. CHF can fall back on that knowledge, what will the RAF fall back on when they've been thrashed around the globe and suddenly we need an amphibious assault with them having never gained the experience or let what little was established fade to nothing?
It is interesting to note the RAF's take on the move of Merlin to CHF and the RN. I suspect that the RAF
PR machine (there's something that could be cut for the common good) is furiously peddling this new line now that the carriers are secure but victory has been won on Harrier.
I don't love CHF per se - the work load is high and we have next to no support doing everything ourselves (very lean - no ops support staff for example - the RAF have got some good ideas... though maybe not in these times and it's so we can fit on a ship) - however,
I will defend to the hilt the capability and Junglie ethos - the cunning and can-do spirit that is applied whenever anyone needs support - that is ingrained in us and we thrive on the opportunity to apply it on ops for the greater good. That Junglie ethos won't survive unless we are kept separate and it is certainly not something that can be replaced or transfered.
Quote: Can we really justify a bespoke CHF?
Pull back from the myopia of Afghanistan and you will realise that GW1, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, GW2 and the extraction of Brit Nationals from Beiruit all happened on, or very close to coastal waters and either involved the use of RN carriers and / or amphibious ships and / or the SK4, Lx7 and Gaz that now come under CHF, either based on board or ashore - so nearly every post cold war conflict bar Afghan
has either involved an Amphibious Op or has been in a location that would have made it possible. What have Iran and Korea got a lot of, dare I ask?! What's that statistic? 80% of the world's population live within 100 miles of the sea? Where does most of our oil come from? Not precise but the gist is certainly true.
Given that we have operated in a secondary role as SH for so long and have a pretty respectable reputation, surely, if it's a 'them or us' then the question should be somewhat different:
How can you justify keeping the RAF Merlin squadrons as they can only bring an SH capability to the party?
We should retain the battle proven Amphibious capability, expertise, Junglie ethos and spirit of an independent RN / RM Commando Helicopter Force as they are leaner than RAF Sqns yet more than capable of acting as SH in their spare time between Amphibious Ops and Ex. CHF's PR machine is well driven but small and as an organization and individuals we prefer to get on with the job in hand rather than shout about it. Unfortunately, this approach, which I have enormous sympathy with, does us no favours in this treacherous time. Forgive me then for this one quote, from a (RAF) head-shed in JHF(A) recently:
"The Sea King 4s are our least capable airframes flown by our most capable crews"
Don't get me wrong, I'd rather see there be an uplift in Chinook numbers so the RAF Merlin force could work Chinook instead - I see no justification in binning any SH Sqns, indeed I disagree with any of the cuts to any service - but I'll be buggered if I'm not going to defend CHF and our RN / RM heritage when we do all that any RAF SH sqn does on ops and yet still deliver a battle-proven Amphibious capability as well all with fewer resources.