ADF Utility Helo Capability Must Be Restored
Am re-engaging here hoping that there will be less inter-service sledging and no more '...inappropriate libelous, defamatory or otherwise tortious language...', as encountered on some threads (see Site Terms & Conditions).
The present parlous situation for the ADF has arisen because Australia has a defence industry policy in lieu of a military preparedness policy with the major arms peddlers now parenting most of defence-related industry in country. Progressive optimization of proven hardware in service (where cost-effective) to maintain continuous and credible military capabilities has been virtually spurned since the Vietnam War. DMO/DSTO now conspire with the big arms corporations to generate expensive projects for industry regardless of whether these are prudent hardware options and they have mostly resulted in big delays, cost overruns and very serious capability gaps. Had Seahawk been fitted with a modular dipping sonar (as available in USN), Blackhawk upgraded including EWSP, Iroquois enhanced to Huey II, the ADF would now have a more credible helo force.
Decommissioning the Iroquois gunship role mid-2003 has left an inexcusable fire support capability gap until maybe mid-2012. Upgradable to Huey II for peanuts (about $2million), an enhanced Bushranger gunship could carry 500 rounds of 20mm HE for podded low recoil cannon (in lieu of 70mm rocket launchers), 12,000 rounds of 7.62mm for miniguns and doorguns, hover in ground effect at around 12,000 feet at max operating weight (10,500 pounds) in ISA+20 conditions and also have some nice systems incorporated. Alas, nobody is held accountable for this 9 year gap in fire support capability or waste of invaluable assets in Iroquois disposal.
Undermanning of some supposed ADF operational units is equally serious. If units cannot be manned with medically fit bods (not obese) to within say 5 percent of their operational personnel establishment; then how can they be considered combat ready in the Order of Battle? But I was always told by highers over the years that the number of units in the Order of Battle was sacrosanct and one must never admit to being inadequately manned! The expansionary visions for the ADF envisaged in Defence White Paper 2009 toward a somewhat mythical Force 2030 structure are thus quite unrealistic in my view.
What might be done regarding helo force capacity? Consider these operating costs per flying hour for 2006/07 provided by Defence (in 2008 dollars): Seahawk - $45,317; Sea King - $23,616; Squirrel - $5,208; Blackhawk - $20,659; Kiowa - $2,865. The operating cost of a Huey II according to Bell Helicopter is below $5,000 per hour. Just guessing, but figures for Tiger and MRH90 will likely exceed Sea King and Blackhawk.
This wisdom is from a comprehensive US Army analysis of Vietnam War operations:
‘The (US) Army's decision to standardize on a utility tactical transport helicopter has far-reaching implications on every operation from its planning to its execution. Literally hundreds of our key battles could not have been fought without a light, agile machine that could go into improbable landing zones at a critical time. Had the Army chosen to build its airmobile tactics around a ‘platoon carrier’, different and less flexible tactics would have been forced on our commanders. As we move to replace the Huey fleet, we must never lose sight of the essential characteristics that made the Huey invaluable to the Infantry commander. Technology offers so many tempting alternatives that one can easily forget the basic problems of squad tactics. The vital lessons which we learned in the ‘sizing’ of our helicopter fleet dare not be forgotten.’ – Lieutenant General John J. Tolson
Discarding the Iroquois leaves the ADF without the most valuable of battlefield support helos, a light inexpensive utility aircraft capable of widely varied roles that can be operated very cost-effectively with some affordable losses in combat.
The MRH90 is clearly too big, heavy, complex, expensive, costly to operate and unsuited in multiple respects for general battlefield utility roles. The most cost-effective solution would be to acquire 50 or more Huey II which have great multi-role flexibility/versatility, including for naval support functions, and it might be more economical to just leave Tiger and MRH90 in hangars! But what types to shed and who might operate whichever is not being argued now.
There would of course need to be offsets to persuade the politicians to go down that track. At risk of being ostracized by my fighter associates, methinks shedding a couple of fighter squadrons and extending the F/A-18 a bit longer would be advantageous. Why? Because the Wedgetail/MRTT/JSF saga has disaster writ all over and the JSF might yet founder as a US project. Making some RAAF manpower available could help substantially in rebuilding a utility helicopter component. There also remains a small window of opportunity when many willing retirees (others) could be co-opted to assist in re-establishing Huey capabilities. CDF Angus may of course shudder at these thoughts, but it is arguably an achievable and affordable proposition if people are prepared to think outside the square in terms of improving ADF military capabilities.
Advisory info re Rex Budd. Now hospitalised in Cairns. Still mentally with it but declining physically.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 17th Oct 2010 at 05:02.