I will continue to share my opinion on the Wannabes forums that the chances and opportunities for airline employment are very poor, have been ruinous and are likely to remain poor next year. I will also continue to advise that the best way into an airline job is to first exhaust any opportunities to join CTC/Any Other SSTR and to expect to pay for everything including Type Rating therefore budget for £100,000.
Even 300 jobs isn't that much when you have just 2 schools outputting that many CPL/IR holders every year...
Yes, I have to agree with this as well. The reality has been somewhat masked by the recession over the last couple of years, but if you bridge the gap between what was an accelerating process prior to that point, and what is likely happen over the coming years as that process is resumed, then here is the reality of what has happened and what is happening. The future is speculative.
Airlines have no burning need for "two hundred and something hour" pilots. Never had, don't now, and probably never will. Airlines represent the top tier of the cake in this industry, and as such they attract a large number of aspirational career advancers. The traditional terms and conditions (to varying degrees) always reflected that reality.
Discounting the small proportion of genuine cadet / apprentice / low hour schemes that a few companies operated in times long gone, the growth in this business came about as a result of a number of legislative and economic factors.
Changes to licencing requirements as a result of the introduction of European "JAR" regulations meant that the hours requirement for a CPL/IR not acquired as a result of an integrated course was reduced from 700 hours to 250 hours. This brought it more into line with the FAA system whereby a CPL/IR was regarded in practice as more of an "aerial work" (instructing / air taxi/ etc.) licence, than an airline entry certificate.
The rapid expansion in the low cost sector of the industry coupled with the competitive threat to established operators that new leaner practices brought with them, meant that companies sought to eliminate or reduce input costs wherever they existed and where they could do so without unduly jeopardising their businesses, or running foul of the regulator.
One way they could achieve this was to tap into the enormous relative supply of aspirational trainee pilots who would fund their own training and pay for the all the type related costs associated with an induction into their businesses.
Bearing in mind the previous paragraph, many of them sought candidates from affiliated or single school programs where there was a large measure of verifiable quality and consistency that they could monitor. In some cases these candidates also could be "purchased" from the supplier on a sale or return basis, and often the candidates came with a self funded cash guarantee bond, that only had be refunded over a number of years. This enabled those airlines to introduce a whole new level of remuneration that reflected the experience level of these cadet programs, without much of the previous training cost or risk.
As is now being seen here, as any degree of new recruiting arises it seems very llikely that however modified, this is still going to be the best hope for low hour pilots looking to jump the experience gap into the right hand seat of an airliner. That jump is likely to require a recognised (by the airline concerned) course of training, and the necessary funds or guarantees to asssume the risk for the costs of training, tenure, and discretionary employment costs.
It is to be hoped that regulatory oversight and insurance risk related costs, will result in airlines continuing to require a significant proportion of experienced candidates for these right seat positions, but as this expansion is still evolving that remains to be seen.