Samsonite suitcases banned!

[nigegilb]

I am curious at your very public defending Equiv, especially as you firmly believe that the crew of XV179 should never have been operating day low level on that fateful day. Which brings me back to two of the consequences of the crash. Which were:

a. Day low level ceased,
b. Suppressant foam procured for the Hercules fleet.

So, how come the crew were down there on that day?

Well, I have had a trawl through the evidence at the inquest. The Flt Cdr makes it clear that he carried out his own risk assessment in both Afg and Iraq in which he personally decided it was appropriate to fly day low level. He did not seek recourse to the advice and guidance of AWC.
"Have you ever discussed this aspect of day low level with AWC? "
Witness "No, no need to."

He did not seek guidance from his chain of command,
Coll "Did the chain approve your day Low Level assessment?"
Witness "I didn’t need to consult them - had all the necessary op info at my fingertips."

He was asked why it was that US forces (all having the protection of foam), refused to fly day low level in Afg, (at this time), but the Coroner would not allow an answer in open court. There was no suggestion that he consulted his American colleagues about their risk assessment, nor the fact that they wouldn't even have gone in theatre without foam. In fact the advice of a serving American pilot on the section was ignored.

He was not aware of the incident involving Harley 37, a Talon, hammered with AAA but ultimately surviving a far worse attack because of ESF. But he was asked this question;
"Would your risk assessment have been assisted by knowledge of US37 Herc."
Witness "No."

When does a commitment to the job in hand become something else? Something that could be considered reckless, earning cudos to the section and the leadership, but placing the lives of those doing the job at great risk? It would appear, that this is what happened on the flight. There was absolutely no scrutiny. A complete failure of the CoC. There was little evidence of formal risk assessment procedures in place to competently assess risk. In fact there was a an apparent refusal to even listen to best practice advice from AWC.(Esp with new equipment). I am not surprised the flight no longer exists as a separate identity. I take nothing away from the people who risked their lives on that section, but the leadership was "jaw dropping" in too many ways.

If the decision to fly day low level was indeed sound judgement by the leadership, day low level would have continued and there would have been no UOR for the aircraft to have been equipped with ESF in the aftermath of the crash.


(Quotes not necessarily verbatim)