Originally Posted by
M2dude
FeathersMcGraw
I did some digging a few months back. It was not a photo as I first thought, but the verbal testimony of a former colleague who was assisting at the crash site in Gonez. He told me that that the Tank 5 inlet valve over-ride switch WAS broken, but the stub appeared to be locked in the OVER-RIDE OPEN position. (It was a DOWTY lever-locked type of switch; once engaged in the detent only a firm outwards motion could release it).
Either way I don't think that there is any real doubt about the final hydro-dynamics of the section of wing lower skin being 'blown out', the tests and investigations here do seem to have been extremely thorough.
Thanks for confirming something I already heard, but was not fully sure about.
Even less air in tank 5 than the 6% "at dispatch", due to transfer during the taxy, simply makes the hydro-dynamics of the event even more likely.
Interestingly, according to the BEA report, the tests done on tank dummies were done with them filled to 100%, so they were already thinking along the same lines.
ChristiaanJ
Point taken my friend, but the damage could still be attributed in my view, at least partially, with the ingress of the runway light and its fittings; we just cannot discount this totally.
I'm not discounting it either, but is there any stainless steel in runway lights, as was traced in #1 engine?
As far as the rest of this tragic event goes, well I'd rather not comment any further here; this is for once a generally well informed (and civilised) thread.
Dude
I couldn't agree more.
But if this thread helps a few people to get a better view of
what happened, I would say it will have fulfilled its function.
Maybe I should add one thing here....
When I first heard about the crash, my first reaction as an engineer was "Oh no... what did we do wrong...?"
Since then, I've tried to learn as much as possible about
what happened, and sometimes (like here) tried to pass it on.
And yes, like M2dude, I've mostly refrained from commenting on my opinion of the
"why", and will at least try to continue to do so.
As I said, it was partly the reaction of an engineer....
On Dec. 29, 1972, a Lockheed 1011 TriStar (Eastern flight 401) crashed in the Florida Everglades.
Within the next few months, and well before the final report came out, we had information about one of the contributary factors to the crash, an incoherent display of the autopilot mode.
And yes, when we started looking at the Concorde system, we found the same possible fault was hidden in the system.
We did the necessary modifications within
weeks (and this was long before the aircraft went into service).
In 2000, I was no longer working on Concorde.
But I had the same gut reaction... "what did we do wrong?" .... "what are we going to do, so it never happens again?".
Sure, I was no longer involved... but somehow it was still "my aircraft".
CJ