I Learned About Flying From That (ILAFFT)

[Hell Man]

Low Vis Sling Ops Incident

Basic Info

Aircraft: MD530F
Local: Rocky Mountains
Elev. 5800ft
Job: Construction Support
When: Late 80’s

Scenario:

I was finishing-up a job flying construction materials to a repeater site in the Rockies. The build was over and there were a number of cement bags remaining which were surplus to requirements and which the contractor wanted transferred back to the staging pad from where they would be returned to his stock.

It was the end of the day with weather, wind and cloud, moving in fast to the ridge-top pad (around 5800ft) on which the final load of cement was waiting. I had been using a 50ft line the entire day.

The Incident:

On my second to last load I noticed that the cloud base had been descending and that the wind had picked up. I was concerned that the final lift might be tight but returned to give it a go. Sure enough the cloud was descending rapidly and there was now light rain meaning reduced vis.

By the time the remote hook was secured to the load, the cloud base (assisted by local downdrafts) was now surrounding me so that I had to lower my height making the line slack in order to maintain visual reference. The wind was bringing in the cloud and rain real fast and I reckoned I had 2-3 mins before the entire pad would be engulfed in the fog.

The loads were being taken to a staging area at around 1500 ft at the bottom of a valley which led up to the ridge pad. The valley was still clear (I had just flown up it) and so I decided to enter IMC, lift the load off the ground while IMC, transit a sufficient distance in the direction of the valley in IMC and then execute a descent.

I entered IMC and kept climbing an additional 30ft vertically while moving easterly in the direction of the valley and which course I held for about 3 seconds before reducing height in order to regain VMC.

The return to VMC took slightly longer than expected so I increased nose down attitude to hasten the cloud break. As I broke cloud I felt a jolt to the fuselage and simultaneously punched the load heaving my head out the door to watch the line, net and cement strafe their way across the tree tops with a spray of cement particles as they did so! My velocity was up around 65kts in a shallow dive at the time of the impact and I continued to contour the valley towards the staging pad.

The Cause:

Pilot stupidity! By going IMC I no longer had vref with the valley into which I was descending. Although I had a good 'feel' for the progress of the deteriorating cloud base my 'feel' was insufficient to make this insane maneuver 'safe' and in the end I was caught out by the weather. The cloud had begun enveloping the ridge pad while I was being connected to the load and was progressing into the valley at a rate which was faster than I had estimated and which is why I remained IMC for longer than anticipated.

Eager to break cloud I nosed down and brought the bottom of the load into dangerous proximity with the terrain (tree tops) resulting in a load strike at the moment of cloud break.

The Luck:

My luck had been to have my hand over the cargo release handle at the time of impact combined with the fact that I seemed to release the load simultaneous to feeling the jolt through the line. Unlike the Lama I was flying, which had a neat little electric switch right next to the cyclic, the 530 had a manual cargo release lever (like a motorbike brake handle) up front of the cyclic – a bit of a reach but I have big hands and could comfortably wrap my fingers over the lever while controlling cyclic with my palm base and thumb.

As the 530 sped down the valley from the incident I recall, in a moment of adrenaline-fuelled madness, screaming “Yee Haa” into the open air as I celebrated my skill in ‘cheating death’ but - about a week later sitting in my chair at home looking at my son I could have punched myself in the head!

The Excuses:

This had been a three day job based in a pre-fab camp at the staging pad, it was the final day with the helo due to return to base that evening. The day had been long, I hadn’t had lunch and was as hungry as a horse. The job was routine and my mind had been elsewhere figuring out the moves on a contract me and my partner were bidding on.

By the time the wind and the rain had moved in we were all but done, just one final load and we were clear. The consequence of landing, coiling up the 50, slinging it in the back, re-entering the hover and attaching the net directly to the belly hook, would (in my view) have resulted in being stuck on the pad overnight. Even to land and coil up the 50 and depart without any load would, in my view, have taken too long so – it was either button the 50 and fly away or .. do what I did!

I had a rep for taking risks without incident – its a bad M.O. but had gained me good business and new clients – I was known for getting the job done! I’m being honest (and showing my age by admitting it now) when I say that there was a part of me that was looking forward to the loadies (ground crew) telling their buddies that I’d disappeared into the clouds in order to get the last load away (yes, very stupid I know!).

Because of the evaporating time, wanting to get the job done, being fed up with the day’s work, feeling tired, cold and hungry, wanting to go home and being a 50% owner in the ship – I thought “I can do what I want” and "I’m gonna finish up this job and I’ll do it anyway it comes!"

The Lessons:

I’ve had around 8 incidents in civilian aerial work (no crashes) and some life-threatening events in Nam. This one passed almost unnoticed but, over the years I’ve reckoned that it had the potential to be one of the worst.

The lesson was pretty straight forward, don’t mess with poor vis – ever! It can be hard when you’ve had enough and your are just seconds away from finishing up and all you want to do is get back home but .. had I been slow in punching off the line or had the belly hook jammed I have little doubt that I wouldn’t be writing this now – let’s say by some miracle I made it – I’d be lying in some hospital bed pretty messed up possibly unable to do anything meaningful in the future – I’d be lying there thinking “If I just waited until the following morning everything would be fine.”

Thankfully I never had to say those words and, as with many (but not all) ex-Nam pilots I had a good many years where I thought I was pretty much untouchable but, as you mature, you begin to see the error of your ways.

Aside from that cardinal rule of keeping the hell away from weather when you need good vis for specialist ops the other two lessons I engraved on my soul were a) Always make sure that your belly hook is 100% operational (as in no question as to its serviceability) b) Always fly with your hand over the cargo release handle/switch while the line is attached.

An old friend M.C. the III ‘rd (also ex-Nam) was doing wood in Alabama with a 58 – the remote hook was working fine but the belly hook was falling open all the time – he told the loadies to weld the hook closed! You tempt fate and she’ll come right up and greet you – on his fourth load after having ordered the belly hook closed .. the line snagged .. down went the 58 and MC was gone!

.. I learnt about flying from that!





(Not the actual helo but a similar setting)

HM