PBL;
Thanks for your response. I wasn't at a point of understanding so as to know whether it was "5" or "7" (or "21") and naively asked the question using Kevin's work. The important point is made, which is, it isn't possible to resolve this failure without the quality of thought and perception understood as "discernability"...a computer cannot "discern/decide" as such activity is not an algorithm. I am not familiar with the technical terms which might be used to describe this but one might view this quality as a "gestalt"....computers cannot "gestalt", they can only do zeroes and ones at extremely high speeds without anticipatory or recollective powers of perception. For me that's one way of putting it - I'm sure there are others.
So, (to Machinbird's point), one altimeter, one airspeed indicator, etc etc "worked" because discernability/decideability was not a problem; the pilot decided, (for better or worse). I'm not sure the problem highlighted is so much a "bandwidth" problem as a discerning/decideability problem. I think this is true because, as others have said (and I agree), the failure of two AoA sensors would be a non-issue for a line crew, (and this may indeed have been the thought process behind not including such failures in warnings to the crew...who knows?). In these specific circumstances, a line-crew would have all the necessary indications for successfully completing the flight.
I wonder what the ACARS maintenance messages were, if any, regarding the AoA's? Notwithstanding the low risk to normal flight, surely two u/s AoA sensors would be NO-GO.
PJ2