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Old 21st Sep 2010, 14:49
  #573 (permalink)  
AirRabbit
 
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Originally Posted by PEI_3721
AirRabbit (#529), thanks. The hub of my point is that there appears to be too greater use of auto brake; even a dependency on it.
Re “ … after thousands of landings you know what is normal …
Perhaps this is an emerging problem; will pilots upgrading to captain be required to have “thousands of landings”, and will all of those be without autobrake to enable experience of foot force vs deceleration? And even with that many landings how many are likely to be on runways which involve reduced friction conditions.
The conditions required might have to be similar to those which were encountered in the example above, however in hindsight did the experience result from error.
Was it an error of judgement – known conditions but an inappropriate choice of action. Or alternatively as the result of poor information or situation assessment where the choice of action appeared reasonable, but was in fact incorrect?
In either case error may have been the root of the experience, i.e. true experience might only come from error.
First – I did NOT say, and it was not my point, that recognizing what may be “normal” came only after “thousands of landings.” Most training programs today use somewhere between 8 and 12 simulator periods. If each simulator period provides each pilot with something like 4 or 5 takeoffs and landings, each pilot should have had in the neighborhood of 30 to 60 takeoffs and landings before they ever reach the airplane. At least some of those takeoffs and landings should have been using the runway contaminant capabilities of the simulator – and, dare I say it, the capability of that simulator to simulate short runways as well. Of course, the circumstances we are describing may occur on the very first flight – but that is not usually the case. Regardless, I maintain the opinion that there should be very few cases where a pilot should not be able to recognize “abnormal” from “normal” decelerations – particularly if the “abnormal” deceleration crops up during what was, up to that point, a “normal” deceleration – even if it is his/her first flight in the airplane.

I do happen to agree that there is likely too much dependency on the “auto-brake” systems on today’s airplanes … and that also applies to the use of “auto-throttles,” and with that, I mean manually manipulating the flight controls, but letting “George” fly the throttles. Dependency easily creeps up on you … ask any drug addict. It’s the same principle when using other “crutches” (like auto-brakes or auto-throttles).

Originally Posted by PEI_3721
…experience of deceleration vs foot force is valuable, in marginal conditions it may only be used to detect a poor situation and mitigate the circumstances. This is an after ‘the fact’ activity – after the decision to land. The real defence against overrun accidents must start much earlier, during the approach briefing – situation assessment, and the decision to land.
I could not agree with you more!

Originally Posted by PEI_3721
Thus the assessment of conditions and how resources are to be used are critical items.
How do pilots gain experience of this? Will pilots have to land in poor conditions resulting in less than expected stopping capability to gain the necessary experience to make a decision, or can this be taught? A similar question as in #528.
Again, I say the education of the pilot starts with ground school. That is where the landing “additives” (to which I alluded earlier) should be taught – not necessarily as specific numbers. They were intended as approximations to provide additional information that may influence approach and landing decisions. Not only do I believe that such things “can be taught,” I firmly believe that they MUST be taught! And, when necessary, whatever is necessary at the time must be used. As most pilots recognize … there are 4 things that are essentially useless to a pilot: 1) the air above you; 2) the runway behind you; 3) knowledge you do not use; and 4) the time before now.
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