Originally Posted by CONF iture
What was needed is a clear AOA DISAGREE ECAM MESSAGE and there is absolutely no complexity to be added for such message to be triggered as the system has already been through the necessary analyze to SILENTLY unvote one ADR.
- let's take that one stage further. The more I look at this the more stupid the AB 'protection' algorithms/rules/ whatever you want to call them appear.
The system 'knows' that the AoA of the 2 sensors is incorrect v IAS and weight. Supposedly it asks the crew to 'check the GW'. Maybe it does, maybe it doesn't; maybe they do, maybe they don't. With a Gallic shrug the system now ignores this anomaly and also 'ignores' the fact that 1 sensor is well past the point at which 'protection' would normally have been triggered. What does it do? NOTHING. Not a peep. Aviation has in all my time worked on the assumption that given 'choices', it should be the safest option that should be chosen. Not by AB. "We will ignore this fact". "2 outvotes 1 and that is that". As far as 'protection' is concerned, we effectively have here a torn condom (French letter?).
OK - we all accept this is an 'oddball' occurrence, unlikely to re-occur in normal operations. BUT the thing that bothers me as a potential AB passenger, and should be worrying the AB crews, is how many other 'protection' software systems use the same policy? Let's seriously hope they find AF447.