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Old 19th Sep 2010, 15:37
  #1278 (permalink)  
NigelOnDraft
 
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Pilots don’t fly the Airbus on AoA, BUT the AoA data are the core of the main protection features of the Airbus
We could debate the semantics, but yes, they are at the core of some of the protections (Alpha Prot, Max AoA). I am not sure that AoA has much to do with Max AoB / Max/Min Pitch / Max/Min 'g' but I am sure you know better

As soon as the AoA data show a discrepancy , it is a the most common sense duty for the manufacturer to clearly advise the crew
Disagree to an extent, and did they show a "discrepency"? They froze pretty much at the same value. I would guess, but am not sure, the system would not adversely react to a single excessive AoA value. Low AoA values (as here) are hard to detect, and not in themselves hazardous.

At this point the crew will proceed as politely as possible to the end of the flight
Really? Where does this come from?

Even better, the crew should be able by a single switch to disable all protection features, making sure they won’t interfere based on faulty information
I am sure the Certification Authorities will fairly quickly act on your advice.

Summary: suggest we take a step back from all the theoretical angles above and review what happened. This is a public transport airliner, flown by well trained crews to fairly unadventurous SOPs. The design philosophy is to make that as safe as possible, within certification requirements. If you truly feel that this accident exposes a serious flaw in the design within that requirement, please post here an event sequence that leads to an accident.

Of course, when one ventures outside that requirement, the "design" features e.g. FBW / protections / auto trim, might start to make life harder. You do not design an aircraft to make test flying easier / safer, you rely on procedures / training to work out the hazards, and avoid / predict them.

SPA83:
CS 25.....

(c) ..... A warning indication must be provided if immediate corrective action is required....
What "immediate corrective action" is required? None at all in normal operations. So I disagree.

I might take you to task with
Has the crew been warned about AoA probes failure ? NO
They had been to an extent - the clearly incorrect Alpha Max/Prot displays - as discussed in the report.

Finally I go back the report:
Causes: Nothing to do with design.
4 recs. None querying the compliance with certification standards. Some tightning up of anomolies that were noted.

NoD
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