If I may, I’d like to quote from the “Letter of Delegation – Engineering Authority” issued by the RAF’s Chief Engineer in January 1992. The postholder was Air Marshal Sir Michael Alcock (whom Mr Haddon-Cave said would have prevented any airworthiness problems before the post was disestablished in about 1998) and who is a vocal supporter of the Wratten/Day ruling.
“If you or your staff become aware of any circumstances, practice or procedure which casts doubt on the airworthiness or safety of any of the aircraft or engines for which you are responsible, you are to take immediate action to restore the situation. In addition, you are to keep me informed of any significant airworthiness or safety matter concerning the aircraft and engines under your authority”.
One assumes CE was aware of his Department’s policy of the day to waste hundreds of millions. And of the consequent policy to cancel/limit core airworthiness activities and divert the funding to replace that wasted. And the fact his senior staffs routinely sought disciplinary action against those who became aware of these “circumstances, practices and procedures” and duly met their obligation by reporting it to their line management (e.g. DGSM’s threat to sack civilian staffs in December 1992 if they did not stop highlighting the waste and increasing impact on airworthiness).
On Chinook specifically, I would ask what the CE thought of the Boscombe statement of 30th September 1993 that the FADEC software was "positively dangerous" and what action he took.
If he was not aware, then (a) his senior staffs were negligent and failed in their duty and (b) he didn’t have the degree of control over his department one would expect of such a senior postholder/manager/leader. If he was aware, he demonstrably took no action during his tenure (1991-96), because Director Internal Audit reported to PUS in June 1996 that the problems, first mentioned in an audit in 1988, were still almost universal.
Again, submitted to Lord Philip.