If an operator empowers a pilot to decide on course of action (call stop), in a time critical event, then it essential that the procedure and crew’s activities are well defined.
This requires that the circumstances for an RTO be clearly defined.
Certification regulations focus on engine failure – loss of thrust (fire etc). Operational issues have been added to this, often without sufficient thought in the process of detecting and assessing the failure.
Thus the first point might be – how do you know it is a tyre failure?
Engine ‘failure’ is reasonably easy to define and thus the decision tends to be an “if - then” activity. However, with other failures the situation is rarely clear cut, e.g. a 'bang', tyre failure or engine surge; – some would argue that neither warrants an RTO in a time critical situation, i.e. at high speed.
Thus the decision process may depend on the stage of the take off.
Does P2 call stop below 80 / 100kts? Or because there is relatively more time for assessment is the decision up to the Captain?
From this example the P2’s duties might be simplified to calling stop only for an engine failure (as defined by the procedure), and only at high speed.
It may be preferable for the decision maker to be the same person as the actor; a subconscious decision may already be in action before the verbal decision is given.
However, this may have complications with Captain-only actions and P2 handling.
Alternatively this arrangement enables the monitoring pilot to aid situation assessment; the call can describe the situation on which the decision maker can act.
On balance it may be better to accept a small delay in change of control for P2 take offs, traded by possibly greater experience of the decision maker.
At high speed, a time critical decision should be biased towards a GO mindset.
When and how is the experience necessary to reinforce this mindset acquired by a pilot; can you be sure that a P2 has reached the required standard?