Hokay - so as a secret aviation nut I followed events at the time very closely, but it was 10 years ago, so I'm working purely from memory here...
EXWOK - if the scenario could not be reproduced with setup as prescribed by the flight manual, did they not attempt to reproduce in accordance with the theory that the fuel tanks were slightly over-filled due to not burning as much on the taxi as they were expecting?
lomapaseo - The hydraulic shockwave theory and the fact that no fuel tank had ever been penetrated by a tyre fragment are compatible, because no penetration is required if it was the fluid dynamics of the fuel that punched the hole in the tank, not the tyre. Another interesting (if somewhat grim) theory on fluid dynamics provides an addendum to the Aloha Airlines 737 accident.
robertbartsch - Have a look at the other thread regarding BA's modifications to the main gear in the wake of problems caused by tyre bursts - the later kevlar modification obviated the need for it and it was subsequently removed. AF did not perform the same modification, but they were using different tyres with completely different characteristics. In fact, the new tyre technology developed in the wake of the accident probably obviated the need for the Kevlar lining according to one engineer, but at that stage the work was already underway. You've also got to remember that despite the unprecedented level of R&D that went into Concorde, she is very much a design of the 1960s. System-level failure engineering to the extent of the multiple events that caused the accident didn't come around until the mid-late 1970s, in the wake of the very public DC-10 incidents that occurred around that time.
I'm a little confused by the invective surrounding the FE's engine shutdown decision, especially as so many posts on here bemoan the disappearance of the FE from the flight deck, in part because they were qualified engineers and capable of independent thought and action. Bjornhall and ChristiaanJ are right - all evidence suggests that the structural failures caused by the fire would have doomed the aircraft whether number 2 was turning and burning or not.
I can understand the attitude of those in the documentary (I remember Captain John Hutchinson from a prior appearance on a BBC Concorde special in the late '80s - particularly memorable for his ****-eating grin whenever he was handling the controls) saying that it should never have happened and that Concorde should not have been taken out of service - she was and will always be an aviation gem and a source of pride to anyone involved with her. But I believe that even if Airbus could have been persuaded to continue producing parts, even if AF could have been persuaded to keep her flying, and yes - even if BA had bitten the bullet and gone it alone (though the unseemly haste with which they disposed of the airframes suggests that the end of Concorde operations was more of a relief to BA Corporate than they are prepared to admit) - I very much doubt Concorde operations would have survived the multiple global economic slowdowns of the last decade - and as such, going out with her head held high when she was still in her prime was a far better way to go than meekly submitting to dwindling demand over several years.