Yes, keep hammering away the shower of ****e that oversaw the undermining of our Airworthiness system .
Indeed I will.
but give Kinloss a break; every time it's mentioned it's just another slap in the face for the hundreds of servicemen and women up there just trying to do their jobs as best they can
Nowhere on this forum, in three separate submissions to Mr Haddon-Cave or in evidence submitted to the House of Commons Defence Committee and Public Accounts Committee have I ever denigrated anyone at any Air Station.
That would be hypocritical because the thrust of this evidence has always been consistent - staffs at 1, 2, 3 and even 4 Line have had their ability to conduct their business properly and safely systematically eroded for over 20 years. It may not be obvious from my posts, but long ago in a different life I worked on the Line and know exactly what the problems are. And one of my oldest schoolfriends has worked on Nimrods at Kinloss almost since leaving school and his was the first name I looked for, in trepidation, when news came through.
I openly admit I am unhappy at many aspects of the Haddon-Cave report. In parts it is laughably inaccurate. His most serious failure was not to report the actions of senior staffs when he was given irrefutable evidence of their complicity; while naming and shaming two junior officers in the IPT. Now, they may have been less than competent
in that field, but that is not an offence. On the contrary, that has been a pre-requisite to advancement in MoD for many years.
Haddon-Cave concentrated on the IPT's failure regarding the Nimrod Safety Case, but there is another viewpoint. At least they let a contract to do the work; other IPTs considered this a waste of money and the Nimrod 2 Star in MoD(PE)/DPA is on record, in writing, as stating that achieving functional safety is optional if it means reducing cost and time. His 4 Star and successive Ministers for the Armed Forces are also on record, in writing, agreeing with this. I have copies of every single letter I refer to and the References were given to Mr Haddon-Cave. He chose, or was persuaded, not to use them; in doing so diverting attention from the real problem.
Why did the Nimrod IPT have to let a contract/task in the first place? The Safety Management System mandates that continuous contract cover exists to conduct continuous review of aircraft and equipment safety. If Baber and Eagles are to be criticised, why not ask why they inherited the situation I describe? THAT is where the answers lie.
I see a malign influence behind Haddon-Cave. Long ago, when he was first appointed, I stated on the MR2 thread that MoD would agree internally to take a hit, but limit it to a certain level. I was right. One day, perhaps Mr Haddon-Cave will explain himself. Overall, his report has been for the good, but I wonder how many in MoD are thinking "I've done far worse" and, crucially, how many "Thank goodness I was senior enough to escape". I ask again. Are you happy that these people are still in MoD or have got off scot-free? I'm not. Their crimes (and yes, they have committed offences) may or may not catch up with them as a result of Haddon-Cave, but they will someday. It may even be the forthcoming Mull of Kintyre Review. After all, the same names will crop up again.