For Smilin_Ed: from about thirty pages ago, the Saberliner is T-39, not T-34. One of each has crashed in the past year (CNATRA training flights) with fatalities. Crew (IP) errors certain in the case of the T-34, near New Orleans. Have not heard from my old friends on the T-39 loss.
For ATC watcher: Your point on stall risks at takeoff and training seems a valid area for improvement.
From the transcript of cockpit conversations, the CRM / Mission focus in that two man crew looks to have eroded before takeoff clearance, with the problem of maintenance events weighing heavily enough on the captain's mind (in re answering to the company) that there looks like a non-trivial "company cultural" (we used to call it Command Climate in the Navy) influence to this mishap.
Why?
If he was preoccupied with his record, or recent string of maintenance delays, I think a human factors analysis would point to contributing factors that led to attention not on checklists, and seven's "killer" lists as one takes position on the runway.
Make sense?
Based on the transcript, it appears the captain made a misdiagnosis of why he had an alert on or shortly after rotation, or lift off. (Engine failure versus stall?). I am not familiar with the cockpit, so I may have guessed that incorrectly. Can any MD-82 drivers explain the differing alerts/sounds so that I can understand better?
Is the common theme of the three points above all related to training, or am I blurring important distinctions?
It appears that the punitive/criminal and safety investigations were conjoined, which strikes me as a process foul. Maybe Spanish/EU law is different from the rules I am familiar with.
Comments on that? Enlightenment?
Read through the whole thread today ... and I am deeply saddened by the loss.
