over land when they selected the waypoint change
Where on earth did this claim come from? As big a rewrite of history as the claim the aircraft was airworthy and serviceable. In all cases, MoD have stated otherwise, many years ago.
-re RadAlt. Before criticising the indicator(s) settings or opining about contributory factors, perhaps the Board should have asked why it was carrying both defects and faults, and was set up wrongly such that it almost certainly misbehaved above 800’ range. Having referenced a report that said a setting (AGC Clamp) was 15dB out and stated that there was no information available to e.g. Odiham (never mind Aldergrove – did they have 2nd line test equipment?) on what the tolerance was, perhaps they would have been wise to investigate why. Perhaps they would have discovered that the tolerance was actually +/- 1dB. If I can read this from notes that pre-date the crash by 12 years, then there is something radically wrong with the MoD process designed to maintain and disseminate that information – and teach people how to implement it. The same notes show that in 1985 the general problem was still ongoing but the contractor was not under contract to rectify it. (Precisely the root problem identified by Haddon-Cave). Not by coincidence is this the very period when AMSO are on record as commencing a campaign of slashing airworthiness-related spending, without any regard whatsoever for impact, culminating in the infamous 1991 ruling that no safety-related tasks shall be conducted.
We know why MoD doesn’t want to go there. Too many stars implicated. But the evidence exists and this time I hope it is heard.