One brilliant blue sky day I was forced by the sound of a familiar hum to dash outside, in time to admire the lines of a 707 sailing overhead the house. The following day I endured the sorry sight of the same aircraft lying on the seabed, having crashed while practicing asymmetrics only 5 minutes after flying over the house.
Australia is replete with stories of asymmetric, for real and in practice, ending up other than the participants would wish. Off the top of my head.
King Air Sydney - all died
DC-3 Sydney ditched with no injuries
404 Jandakot - survivors and fatalities
402 Essendon - no survivors
RAAF C-130 spin safe recovery
RAAF P-3 ditto
Brasilia Darwin fatal
B55 Port Lincoln - one fatal, others injured
B76 Camden - one fatal, one injured
Clinton, I think that you are missing the point that the issue has absolutely nothing to do with a particular aircrafts fuel/mixture/induction system design. It has everything to do with conducting the training in as safe as possible manner.
From page 13 of FAA “FLYING LIGHT TWINS SAFELY”, produced under their Aviation Safety Program.
TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS
Regular training and practice with a qualified instructor is essential for proficiency in any airplane.
• Thoroughly brief simulated engine failures in advance. The pilot under instruction should know how such failures will be introduced, and what action is expected in response. Unannounced engine failures are suitable only in testing and checking scenarios, and when both pilots have agreed to such before the flight.
• Low altitude engine failure practice is never worth the risks involved. Multiengine instructors should approach simulated engine failures below 400 feet AGL with extreme caution; failures below 200 feet AGL should be reserved for simulators and training devices.
• All simulated engine failures below 3,000 feet AGL should be accomplished by smoothly retarding the throttle.
• Recognize that aircraft systems knowledge is critically important. Practice systems failures too, including partial panel instrument training.
• Occasionally practice OEI flight with a yaw string to observe bank angle and ball position for zero sideslip, particularly at Vyse.
• Do not alter the airplane configuration on the runway after landing unless there is a clear operational need. A striking number of inadvertent landing gear retractions have occurred when the pilot intended to retract the flaps.
From “Engine out Booby Traps for Light Twin Pilots”
An analysis of light twin accidents following engine failure in the initial climb after take off showed that 57% of these accidents and 75% of fatal/serious injuries resulted from situations in which control was lost. Low airspeed results from vain attempts to climb or hold altitude under conditions which render this impossible. Loss of control typically results from low airspeed combined with too much or too little bank angle, i.e., either more or less than that corresponding to zero sideslip.
Analysis was conducted of light twin engine out stall/spin accidents in the initial climb out after take off. During a 28 month period there were at least 7.7 accidents and 24 fatalities per year with a 95% fatality rate for occupants.
Fatal stall/spin accidents over a six year period comprised 10% of all multi engine fatal accidents. Half of these accidents occurred during training situations.
Compared to a 95% fatality rate in stall/spin accidents, controlled force landings of light twins are virtually 100% survivable. During the 28 month period cited earlier showed 41 controlled force landings, including several into trees, with a total of 106 individuals involved. There were no fatalities and only 9% received serious injuries. The remaining 91% experienced minor or no injuries.