The thing is, though, the A300 had flown and continued to fly uneventfully with its design rudder system for years.
I was corrected a few pages ago for thinking the A300 had the same autotrim as later Airbi, but the basic principles of rudder application apply regardless. You can't employ rapid, aggressive rudder reversals on big jets, no matter the material compostition of the structure or the manufacturer. The structure won't withstand it. That AA 587's flying pilot didn't know that is basic to the cause of the accident.
Further, a wake turbulence encounter at AA 587's altitude did not require the drastic correction taken. Escape is easily accomplished with an slight upwind turn or altitude level off. Rapid full rudder reversal was not called for, and never is.
Remember Dutch roll on B-707s and DC-8s? The counter was a brief full aileron against the oscillation, neutral controls, then a brief full aileron against the return, opposite direction oscillation. Too much aileron, or any rudder at all accelerated the oscillations. The lesson of the modest control inputs applies to wake turbulence as well.
I think blaming Airbus for faulty design is wrong when the real cause was improper pilot technique, for which I do not fault the pilot as his training curricula overlooked the well known problem of excessive rudder application in opposite direction.