Johns, re #20.
You cite a very narrow and dated view of CRM. Whilst modern crewing problems and behaviours are far from perfect, there have been many improvements.
CRM has evolved; I prefer a view which is based on knowledge of human factors, particularly about the individual, and the application of that knowledge to produce the required behaviours. I believe that this definition encompasses most modern definitions of CRM.
A high number of flight hours can be an advantage if experience has been gathered (knowledge, understanding, memory) and then that this is used in context, but even these pilots are not exempt from human weakness.
A low-hours first officer should have sufficient experience to be ‘safe’ (requirements) and the knowledge to conduct specified duties. S/he has to recognise that this is the first step on the ladder and there is a need to learn how to apply that knowledge in context. There has to be a willingness to learn – an individual behaviour, and Captains have to provide the necessary ‘CRM’ instruction – a willingness to help.
Congress appears to be blaming pilots, and in requiring change, are they admitting that new pilots are not ‘safe’. Thus, as the principal law maker, is Congress also admitting that they have misjudged previous law; on what evidence, what basis, data, research …? Can Congress change human behaviour? Perhaps they should consider a CRM course, or at least some HF training, with reference to (political) bias – being seen to do something.
Moving on; Turbo ‘where next for CRM’.
“ the list of topics contained in EU-OPS is irrelevant. ” (Appendix 1 to EU-OPS 1.965 Para 4, A to K).
No I don’t believe so; at least use A to H as a basis of teaching HF knowledge. Then – CRM is the application of that knowledge.
“ Targets. ” It’s a good idea to have a target, but how are these to be defined, particularly in CRM terms. Existing targets for acceptable levels of behaviour (behavioural markers) appear to be reasonable if they are used. Thus, perhaps the poor implementation of existing concepts is a problem.
“ modes of training delivery need rethinking ”. Not mode as in method of delivery, but yes as in training content. Rebalance the social - cognitive items towards the latter. Yes HF instruction requires more time, but then how will pilots gain experience of applying HF.
“ the skills of most facilitator need strengthening ”. Do we need facilitators?
HF knowledge can be taught – instructors. The application of HF would benefit from facilitation, but better results may be gained from facilitation in context - exercising HF skills with a mentor on the flight deck.
“ training development needs to be recognised as more important than delivery ”. I don’t follow this. If training is to impart HF knowledge then what else other than instructional skills can be developed?
Considering the application of HF as training, then yes this is important and requires recognition as an operational task. Many operators have taken CRM into LOFT, but this needs extending to all operations; embed CRM into daily activities – this is one of the prime requirements covered by ICAO.
Are all Captain’s willing to be a mentor? They should be capable of delivering the CRM ‘message’ as these skills fall within Captaincy. The main problem is time, particularly debriefing time;- time to digest the knowledge, its application, and commit this to memory for future behaviour.
These activities are not flight hours, its time available for learning, and some of that is controlled by the individual - a willingness to learn and keep on learning.