Although now semi-retired I do have many thousands of hours on most versions of the 737 (in both seats) and have also been a simulator instructor on the type. Additionally I have observed a simulator session with THY and was horrified by what I saw. It reminded me very much of the unfortunate 747 freighter accident at Stansted some years ago- a relatively minor aircraft technical problem exacerbated by a complete lack of modern CRM thinking. Unfortunately THY still have a long way to go to get rid of the problematic ex-military dominance still prevalent in many airlines. Other comments can be found on Pprune from expatriate pilots echoing my experience after working for the airline.
IMHO one of the main reasons for the dramatically improved safety levels of European and US airlines has been the acceptance that ALL crew members are fallible no matter what their previous experience. It took many disastrous fatal accidents to break down the historical subservience of co-pilots and (where applicable) flight engineers.
THY along with other airlines from that part of the world still suffer from a dominance by ex-military pilots and only time will erode this problem. The current drive to employ ex-patriate pilots and instructors may (hopefully) improve matters.
In the simulator session that I observed there were no checklists available and apparently little cockpit discipline- as regards who did what and when! I was reminded by one of the crew that the PF was an ex military test-pilot.(So what?) Mobile phones were even answered during the session!
Much has been said on this and other threads about low hour pilots from approved training establishments in Europe. I consider myself fortunate to have flown with many of these people and their deeply engrained professionalism demonstrated has always impressed me. Unlike pilots of my generation who often came via a self-funded and rather chaotic route these guys have been trained in the correct way of getting the job done right from the outset. Their experience levels are, of course, low but they generally have few bad habits to get rid of and absorb new knowledge like sponges. Given the choice I would much rather share a cockpit with one of these guys (or girls) in preference to a high hour,disgruntled ,by-passed alternative!
Stall recovery is something that is routinely taught in all the Boeing approved courses and disconnection of the auto-throttle is often done (although it was not actually stipulated in the Boeing manual). There are no bans on disconnection at any time and this ensured that one was not going to have to maintain a hand on the thrust levers during the recovery manoeuvre. THY seem to be trying to claim this as an excuse for the resultant full stall of the aircraft. As other contributors have pointed out- recovery from the stick shaker on any 737NG is extremely easy because of the enormous amount of available thrust and the relatively rapid response rate of the engines (c.w the old JT8s on the 100/200 versions).
Another very common fault I have observed on simulator training is excessive trust in the A/T! (“look no hands!”) Boeing have re-iterated this recently- a hand MUST be kept on the thrust levers throughout any coupled approach. Unlike the Airbus –all Boeings have continuous feed-back to the thrust levers (even on the FBW 777 and 787) which means any significant thrust command changes can be sensed from the levers.
Schipol abbreviated approaches can be somewhat stressful at times if the crew are not familiar with them- as a result of requests to maintain speed and then join the G/S from above -but there is ALWAYS the option of a go-around. With three people in the cockpit it seems amazing that no-one reacted to the speed loss until too late. An immediate recovery from the shaker is easy but once approaching the full stall the now reduced elevator response combined with the pitch-up effect from full thrust makes things much more problematic! That is why we ALWAYS teach recovery at the stick shaker!