(Have cross posted this from my ARRSE post)
The more I look into this, the more I think the RN is potentially playing an absolute blinder of a hand.
The buy of 50 airframes means that the RN is looking at pretty much the same sort of structure as in SHAR days – 899 with the OCU of 10-15 frames, 2 x front lines sqns (800 / 801) with 12 frames and the remainder in storage / trials etc. This is not far short of the original SHAR replacement figure of 60 airframes back in the mid 90s (I recall reading one of the first issues of AFM I bought on this subject). The result is that the RN will be able to deliver a maximum of 1 CVF with two sqns on board.
This has some interesting follow on implications. Firstly, a buy of 50 aircraft kills dead the concept that the RN is seeking to surge 2 airwings to sea at any one time. This means we can look to reduce supporting buys, such as MASC and maybe even MARS, potentially realizing savings. Additionally we effectively gain a carrier hull to do with as we want. Either we offer to cancel it – saving some (but not much) money, or we instead use its helo capability and declare the non strike carrier to be the replacement for HMS OCEAN – meaning we can kill the LPH(R) project too.
At the same time, the near term presents some savings options as well. The RN could offer to pay off a carrier (possibly Ocean, given her many problems and the fact she’s nearly life expired) and use the two remaining hulls purely in an LPH mode for the next couple of years, and allow the staff onboard to practice carrier strike with foreign airframes. At the same time, the RN puts forward a ‘delete Harrier’ option, bringing GR9 OSD forward to now. Some of the resultant savings get used as an enhancement option, and the RN spends the money in the US training on the existing F18 for the next few years. In other words, we use USN assets (I believe they still have a carrier dedicated purely for training) to regenerate the skills required for CTOL carrier aviation. Meanwhile the maintenance chaps go and learn how to fix the plane, and in 5-6 years time, the RN can stand up at least an OCU worth of carrier qualified pilots, and hopefully a squadron as well. This means that the CVF is an effective asset from day 1, and not an expensive bath toy floating round waiting for the JSF to be worked up.
We end up with the RAF looking clear losers from this – if the RN goes down the road of F18, then a Delete GR4 and GR9 option looks dangerously close to reality. The RAF is left with the Typhoon for everything, and the RN meanwhile has F18. A two aircraft FJ fleet, with roughly 200 airframes – if the funding is found to do some integration so we can use them properly, then this is a roadmap for the future. At the same time the UK can look to a future JSF buy, either as an attrition cum replacement for F18, or as the eventual DPOC / Typhoon A2A replacement.