One of the problems in this matter has been the poor wording in Manuals and similarly, yet different, the view taken by the FAA – three views at least, certification, regulatory, and training/checking.
If the objective is to train to the approach to the stall, as may have been the case, then this requires specific aspects of awareness and flight techniques.
With more recent focus on Loss of Control, then training has been diverted to ‘upset recovery’ vice a stalled aircraft. This training is very context dependent.
Only now is stall training being considered again in detail, and this too depends on context and may require specific awareness and ‘aircraft type dependent’ techniques.
Attempting to unravel poor descriptions, undo weak training practices, and simultaneously introduce new programs will be fraught with problems – thus we have arrived.
As much as BOAC might not like certification regulations
, a good understanding of these will aid training requirements and an understanding of manufacturers’ recommendations.
Although the requirements in CS25 / FAR25 etc, might not be in accord with academic theory, they are the basis on which particular aircraft have been judged – what aircraft do in practice and not what they should do in the classroom.
Of the commercial types which I was associated with, the stall evaluation was extensive. It progressed well beyond any training stall or concept of an upset manoeuvre, in search of the academic T tail deep stall (wind tunnel predicted), but which as far as we know, is not encountered – (from Vss, hard stick back, 5 deg/sec pitch rate, resulting in at least 5 deg stall alpha over-swing).
Turning stalls did induce a wing drop, for which lateral control can be used to aid recovery (as per CS25), but this may not be generic advice as control response in such conditions will be type dependent.
It’s nice to ensure that the inner wing stalls before the tip and thus enable conventional ailerons to be used.
Of course things don’t always go as planned. With development and increasing weight the stalls became more variable with a notable roll off. Extensive aerodynamic instrumentation failed to disclose a reason and the wt/cg certification was limited by the maximum roll angle with use of full control (aileron and rudder) in the stall.
Subsequently, slight wing twist at high weight has been identified as the likely problem.
None of the above would be of direct relevance to a training program, except perhaps a better understanding of why this manufacturer in this particular aircraft type includes the use the aileron or rudder control as required to control roll angle during a stall recovery.
IMHO the issue which the regulators (training) should be looking at is why aircraft are deviating from safe flight into the speed/manoeuvre safety buffer prior to stall warning and an actual stall; what’s generating these problems.
Also, as noted by BOAC, understand trim; there are some significant differences both in theory and application amongst modern aircraft types.