the issues I have identified are systemic and deep-rooted.
It may only be 4 consecutive years by the CAG, but the root cause of these systemic problems were highlighted in 1987 (in the case of the RN - the RAF already had the problem) and were the subject of a very critical report in June 1996 by MoD's own internal auditors (who reported direct to PUS, the Chief Accounting Officer). This report made 19 recommendations. None were implemented.
It may seem like beancounting, but this has significance across procurement, especially in these days of "incremental acquisition", which frequently involves modifying what you have. By definition this means you need to know what you already have in order to quantify and then cost the modification. If you don't know what you have, then the programme can't be costed properly, which leads to (a) programme not being approved or (b) if it is approved, either cost escalation as you've bought too little or wastage as you've bought too much. Sound familiar?
As a former MoD Commercial Director, Mr Morse would be well aware of the above report. Wonder why he didn't mention it?