The RAAF Historian failed to recognise that helicopter technology around 1960 was pretty rudimentary as demonstrated by the types being operated by British forces in Malaysia and US forces in Vietnam in the early 1960s. It would have been folly to venture into anything larger than the Iroquois at that time given the other re-equipment programs in train.[/font]
The RAAF historian was bang on the money
The RAAF made no effort to support the army in the way that the Army wanted and no attempt to rewrite history can change this fundamental fact.
Vietnam involvement for Australia was not on the horizon when the Iroquois were introduced to RAAF service and the US Army was similarly ill-equipped when Iroquois were first deployed to Vietnam.
Absolute tosh. The Army was operational in Vietnam before the first tranche of UH1B were delivered and by the time the last of the UH1B’s were delivered Captain Noel Delahunty had been awarded a Military Cross for performing the world’s first ‘Hot extraction’, by helicopter in April 1964
The USAAF had been operating Hueys in Vietnam since 1962 and DARPA lost their first Huey Gunship in January 1964
WO1 George Chinn who flew on the resupply to D company 6RAR in August 1966 had already been awarded a DCM for his part in a helicopter assault landing in Thua Thien two years earlier, back in April 1964.
That the RAAF were woefully unaware of these developments and the fact that they had to be dragged kicking and screaming to perform the resupply at Long Tan is a shocking indictment of the RAAF’s unwillingness to accept the manner in which the Army required to be supported. A manner in which the Army had been supported in Vietnam since 1962 by US Army, US Marine and RVN Air Force Helicopters. Since 1962.
The RAAF were required to provide a C-47 to support the AATTV commitment way back in 1962. The RAAF didn’t provide it because the RAAF had no interest in what was occurring in Vietnam. The Army instigated an exchange programme from FARELF to the US Forces in Vietnam in 1962. The RAAF could have done likewise but didn’t.
All this is going on before August 1964 when the RAAF Caribou’s arrived in theatre.
By the time that 9 squadron arrived in Vietnam in 1966 they had the gear but no idea. That they had no idea was the RAAF’s own fault
Not mentioned by W/C Sharp was that the Australian Army also had a significant learning curve when they first deployed to Vietnam in 1965 as part of US 173rd Airborne Brigade.
Absolutely true but 1RAR sorted out its operational issues with 173rd Abn in a matter of months not years. As your next anecdote suggests the RAAF had failed to address the Army’s support requirements in 1968 a good two years after the Australian task force commander threatened to send 9 squadron home in ignominy. The RAAF made no effort to support the army in the way that the Army wanted because the RAF made no effort to understand what the Army required or indeed where and how the RAAF might be required to serve.
Vung Tau received multiple rocket attacks because it was a worthwhile target whereas Nui Dat was principally just a concentration of sand-bagged tents and not really worth enemy effort, although that may have differed had an Iroquois squadron been co-located. (Image of 9SQN hangar facilities at Vung Tau airfield to be inserted
Rather than inserting a photo of the hangar facilities at Vung Tau, how about you provide some information on the number of airframes destroyed or damaged during these multiple rocket attacks. A breakdown of RAAF casualties killed and wounded in these terrible attacks on Vung Tau would be illuminating.
Here is an interesting statistic. 1 in 17 RAAF personnel serving in Vietnam was granted a British Award. “Never in the field of human conflict has so much fruit salad been granted to so few”
Remarkably, this fact does not institutionally embarrass the RAAF. The woeful RAAF response to the Task Force’s helicopter needs is unlikely to embarrass them either.
Mick
Last edited by chippymick; 20th Jul 2010 at 10:38.