Part 2 Comments On Posts #1,#2,#3
Since Army helicopters operated at Nui Dat, apparently without difficulty, the RAAF’s case may have seemed unconvincing to some. Whatever the merits of the RAAF’s case, it should have been up to the operational commander to make such decisions and the failure of the RAAF to respond to the Army’s requirements did not help its case for retaining control of the helicopters.
Really! The 3 Services were independent entities at that time with Vietnam elements under overall command of a Saigon-based General with an Air Force deputy commander. Commander 1 ATF only exercised operational control of 9SQN which was appropriate and all that was necessary. The Air Force never had any problems assigning operational control to the other Services but they declined operational command for sound reasons in my view with the Vung Tau basing issue a good example wherein the initial 1 ATF commander had an inadequate appreciation of aircraft engineering and maintenance related considerations. (images to be inserted).
To improve liaison with the task force, the senior RAAF officer from Vung Tau, Group Captain Raw, relocated to the task force headquarters and established an air transport operations centre. However, Group Captain Raw was inexperienced in air/land operations and his relationship with the commander of the ATF was strained.
The 1ATF command and control structure derived from joint-Army/RAAF planning in Australia based on JSP doctrine which provided a Task Force Air Commander, Task Force Air Support Officer, small air transport operations cell (ATOC) and a close air support cell, both of the latter bits having essential communications infrastructure and being annexed to the HQ Command Post. The small ATOC was staffed by Air Force junior officers and clerks.
9SQN was the only RAAF unit under opcon 1ATF with 35SQN Caribou under opcon USAF 7th Air Force, so the initial 1ATF RAAF component was arguably top heavy. This morphed into the TFAC more or less becoming an Air Force base commander at Vung Tau where 3 units were located. 9SQN provided a TFAC Representative at Nui Dat staffed by rotation of Squadron Leaders and senior Flight Lieutenants. I performed this role for 2 plus months during my last of 3 tours. TFAC Rep got involved in joint planning for major activities and also had an integrity oversight responsibility for 9SQN operations.
The ATOC responded directly to Army in the CP for Iroquois tasking and there was seldom need for intervention by the TFAC Rep as the system hummed along smoothly. This anecdote portrays the only occasion I exercised any authority. The 9SQN night dustoff aircraft had been tasked to recover a badly wounded enemy prisoner for interrogation. The aircraft captain was inexperienced and when approaching a strobe light in dense inky black jungle for winching of the prisoner, observed another strobe light nearby. I was monitoring all the radio nets and the ground callsign was adamant they only had one strobe light. The enemy were displaying another in close proximity so I directed the captain to abort. The G2Ops got a bit peeved but the prisoner died soon after.
Many ATF operations were also supported by US Army helicopter units and inevitably comparisons were sometimes drawn between the RAAF and the US Army. With a huge fleet of helicopters at its disposal, the US Army was willing to endure losses at a rate that could not have been sustained by a relatively small military force like that of Australia; indeed, many professional airmen considered the US Army’s use of helicopters in Vietnam to be profligate.
Early 1968, when 9SQN was expanding to 16 x UH-1H Iroquois with more capacity for troop movement, several pilots (including myself) were briefly detached to the composite US Army/RAN 135th Assault Helicopter Company for insight into US Army operating practices. There had been 3 catastrophic Iroquois mid-air collisions at another nearby US Army base and we all adjudged their formation flying procedures as stressful and unsound.
Several of us had formerly flown fighters so we simply adopted fighter low level battle formation for Iroquois tactical trooping with multiple benefits including much reduced collision risk, door-gun cross-cover, manoeuvring flexibility and more relaxed flying as can be seen from the following illustrations. (images to be inserted).
Another issue that created friction between the Services was the arming of helicopters. RAAF helicopter operations were sometimes supported by US Army gunship helicopters (modified UH-1 Iroquois), but coordination of gunship missions was difficult and the arrangement was not always entirely satisfactory.
Wrong, and similar statements have been made by some military historians. I was project officer for development of the RAAF UH-1H Iroquois gunship version and its operational introduction 13 months later. Herewith relevant extracts from a comprehensive well- illustrated e-book on CD that I produced concerning the project.
'...Prior to April 1969, helicopter gunship support for 1ATF was provided by the US Army being generally quite good and 9SQN worked in harmony with American gunship crews; however, availability became a cause for concern. The US Army tasking philosophy aimed at sharing activities among many of their units in the III Corps area of operations and gunships often ferried from bases to scenes of operations virtually on opposite sides of the country. Transit flying in hours of darkness was generally avoided by gunship units and a Light Fire Team (US Army parlance for a flight of 2 gunships) might spend up to 4 or 5 hours of daylight travelling to and from Nui Dat, thus limiting availability for operations. There were several US Army gunship equipped units within about 45 minutes flight time but these elements were often operating at distant locations when very urgent gunship support was required.
...The normal SAS role was covert reconnaissance but soon after the 1968 Tet Offensive, the SAS squadron in theatre became more involved in ambush activities frequently inflicting casualties upon the opposition. Inevitably, it became more difficult for SAS patrols to break contact with the enemy resulting in increasing contested extractions and it was only a matter of time before a patrol was overwhelmed before extraction could be effected if gunship support was not immediately available.
...Majority of contested SAS extractions were in jungle up to 150 feet high. The enemy at times was within cricket pitch proximity of the patrol and the hoisting process took 20 or more minutes on occasions with both SAS and 9SQN exhausting ammunition.'
The modifications were very successful and increased the capability of 9 Squadron, but the Army and some members of the RAAF sought a more potent gunship capability in the form of the Bell AH-1 Cobra. The Army presented a cogent case in favour of the Cobra, but the Air Staff insisted that the modified Iroquois were satisfactory. The RAAF’s willingness to accept a second rate solution for its helicopter requirements was in stark contrast to its attitude towards fixed-wing aircraft, where the need to always acquire leading edge technology had been firmly established.
Wrong again, (SIGH!!). 9SQN acquired components of the XM-21 system as fitted to US Army UH-1C to experiment with design configurations for the UH-1H which had never been designed for the gunship role. The XM-21 system was like something out of Jules Verne with traversable miniguns that were electro-hydraulic and unnecessarily complex for reliability so we gutted the electrics and hydraulics and converted the system to a fixed forward-firing arrangement (like fighter aircraft) operable by either pilot with swing down gun-sights mounted above the front windscreens.
The mature RAAF Bushranger gunship was far from a second-rate capability, carried more ammunition with better firepower than the basic AH-1G Hueycobra, had more gun redundancy and very broad fields of fire for the door-gunners (each had twin M60s) who were able to suppress virtually behind the aircraft. A suitably wired UH-1H with gun-sights permanently fitted could be configured as a gunship within 90 minutes, including weapon system harmonisation, and full refuel/rearm was achieved in 10 minutes. Conversely, it could be de-configured in 30 minutes. These characteristics exemplified flexibility, versatility and economy of effort which are long-standing principles of war-fighting.
The Australian Army were infatuated with the Hueycobra, but it was the RAAF who were doing this aspect of the fighting and the Bushranger gunship proved highly effective. The Army always believed they had a right to tell the Air Force what hardware to buy, but their expertise in this regard has proved very deficient with their own acquisitions.
And finally, how would a bloody navigator know what air to ground gunnery is all about?
Methinks enough for this segment. A final bit yet to come and I will get the referenced images up within a day. Beer needed now.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 20th Jul 2010 at 20:50.