Comments On Post #1,#2,#3
Herewith some views on the paper by Wing Commander Martin Sharp, RAF from the Fourays website.
...The RAAF’s lack of attention to the battlefield support role was a considerable frustration to the Army, and led to tensions in Army/Air Force relations over command and control of battlefield aircraft...
Close air support training was always a major facet of RAAF strike and fighter squadron activities, ergo, continual significant provisioning for armaments and war reserves ammunition stockpiling.
...In December 1960 the Army established No. 16 Army Light Aircraft Squadron to fulfil its new roles. The unit was formed at RAAF Amberley in Queensland from the nucleus of the Air OP Flight, and was equipped with Cessna 180 aircraft and Bell 47 Sioux helicopters...it was agreed that the RAAF would train sufficient Army technicians to enable them to take over RAAF functions, and from 1964, the RAAF began to extricate its personnel from Army Aviation. Nevertheless, the RAAF retained responsibility for airworthiness, engineering standards, aviation supplies and flight safety management...
When visiting Amberley early 1960s, I was astounded at the openly expressed bitterness of some AAvn personnel (who were being hosted on a RAAF base) at the Air Force having oversight responsibility for their activities - 16ALA Squadron was commanded by a RAAF officer at the time. That core of now retired malcontents have generated much of the anti-Air Force misinformation over the years.
...when No. 9 Squadron was reformed in 1962 to operate the Iroquois, it was designated as a search and rescue squadron by the RAAF, but it soon became apparent that Army support would be the main role of the Iroquois. A second Iroquois squadron was established in 1964, deploying to RAAF Butterworth in Malaysia later that year...
9SQN only received its first aircraft late 1962 and the build-up to 2 squadrons from scratch within 18 months was a much under-rated feat, only possible because the Air Force then had significant surge capacity. There was a huge effort in technical and aircrew training plus progressive involvement in Army support training in Australia as 9SQN grew. The RAAF responded admirably to the government requirement to form a second squadron for deployment to Malaysia for support of Army in counter-insurgency operations.
...Nevertheless, as the RAAF Historian has noted, the RAAF should have strived to support the Army in the way the Army wanted, not the way the RAAF found least troublesome...
The RAAF Historian failed to recognise that helicopter technology around 1960 was pretty rudimentary as demonstrated by the types being operated by British forces in Malaysia and US forces in Vietnam in the early 1960s. It would have been folly to venture into anything larger than the Iroquois at that time given the other re-equipment programs in train.
...In 1966, eight Iroquois from No. 9 Squadron were deployed to Vung Tau in South Vietnam to support the 1st Australian Task Force (ATF) operating throughout Phuoc Tuy Province. The RAAF appear to have been reluctant to deploy the helicopters, which were ill prepared for the task facing them, lacking armoured seats, door gun mounts and body armour for the crews...
Vietnam involvement for Australia was not on the horizon when the Iroquois were introduced to RAAF service and the US Army was similarly ill-equipped when Iroquois were first deployed to Vietnam. They ordered 1,000 sets of Sagami gun mounts for Bravo/Charlie model Iroquois to be manufactured in Japan. Armoured seats were retro-fitted when they became available and body armour, which was a wide usage Army need, continued to be scrounged because of shortages in the US supply system on which 9SQN depended.
...When the RAAF helicopters were deployed, senior Air Staff in Canberra were keen to see that they were not put to undue risk and issued a directive placing strict limitations on their employment. For example, RAAF helicopters were authorised to lift troops only ‘from a secure staging area to a landing zone that is relatively secure and where enemy resistance is not expected’, and ‘from an area of operation to a secure staging area when enemy resistance is anticipated only on the last lift from the landing zone’...
Pre-Vietnam, the Australian military conformed with British Joint Service Planning doctrine and that pertained to 5SQN operations in Malaysia which was a Brit controlled scenario. The contentious Air Staff Instruction derived largely from JSP doctrine but the operational scenario in Vietnam differed considerably and was US controlled. Not mentioned by W/C Sharp was that the Australian Army also had a significant learning curve when they first deployed to Vietnam in 1965 as part of US 173rd Airborne Brigade.
The ASI did cause confusion initially, but 9SQN was then fortunate to have a considerable number of senior experienced pilots, some veterans of conflicts from WW2 onwards, who generally exercised their judgement in operational situations ignoring the ASI. Unfortunately, it remained in the unit Confidential Order Book and as junior pilots ex-flying training schools and Iroquois conversion with minimal Army support training in Australia began flowing into the squadron, some acrimony was generated through some very minimal instances best illustrated by an anecdote.
Near mid-1968, when 9SQN was hugely busy operationally while simultaneously doubling in aircraft and personnel strength, a junior pilot came up to me in a troubled state seeking advice. He had been operating near Saigon and a ground unit requested assistance so he asked in his very direct manner of speaking: 'Is your area secure'. The response was 'No' and he apparently responded something like: 'Sorry, but we cannot help you yet' which triggered some aggravation. When he asked what should he have done, I responded: 'Best not to ask that question', to which he said: 'Well, I bloody well won't do so again'.
His bravery could not be questioned as I later recommended him for a DFC which he was deservingly awarded for his role in a night extraction of a SAS patrol in contact; nor could his dedication to support of the troops because he later said to me: 'The biggest buzz I get is taking hot meals out to those poor buggers when they are all wet and shivering'. He was a fine young airman but sadly later killed in a flying training accident in Australia. The controversial ASI became unilaterally ignored as the squadron matured to full strength and comprehensive operating procedures were developed in concert with 1ATF.
...The Army also operated its own aircraft in Vietnam, including six Bell 47 Sioux helicopters and Cessna 180 fixed-wing aircraft from 161 Reconnaissance Flight...The Flight had a number of RAAF personnel on its strength, but some of them seemed less than happy to be serving with an Army unit; an RAAF officer who visited the airmen noted: ‘the reaction of the airmen to field conditions has at the outset been disappointing.’ It seems that the airmen were ill prepared for their task and their reaction to the conditions probably did little to engender the RAAF to the Army...
Not mentioned is the reason for RAAF involvement with 161 Recce Flight was that maintenance standards had decayed.
...One issue typifying the difference of outlook was the location of 9 Squadron. The task force commander wanted the Squadron based forward at Nui Dat alongside the task force headquarters, but the RAAF refused to move from Vung Tau...
9SQN was logically based at Vung Tau in accord with principles in JSP doctrine for locating air units. Nui Dat was only 25 kilometres distant, just 10 minutes Iroquois flight time. US Army supply system and engineering resources were located at VT, also an impressive technical resource, the USS Corpus Christy Bay, was moored in the harbour and invaluable for aircraft component re-plating and other precision engineering. Constant electrical power and illumination enabled 24 hour maintenance work.
Vung Tau received multiple rocket attacks because it was a worthwhile target whereas Nui Dat was principally just a concentration of sand-bagged tents and not really worth enemy effort, although that may have differed had an Iroquois squadron been co-located. (Image of 9SQN hangar facilities at Vung Tau airfield to be inserted).
The RAAF has been roundly criticised for this decision over time, but the proceedings of the Chief of Army History Conference 2002 belatedly determined that Army planners erred in basing at Nui Dat and should have located 1ATF at Vung Tau.
Perhaps best we break at this point as there is a fair bit more to be said re the rest of Martin Sharp's paper.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 19th Jul 2010 at 22:12.