I'm not sure why you've posted this, Brian, but having served as a helicopter pilot with both RAAF and Army (and joined at about the same time as the good WGCDR, incidentally), I can appreciate his writing style but not the thrust of a lot of what he says.
It appears that WGCDR Sharp has done a lot of homework in producing this treatise, but although he's included many verifiable facts, he frequently makes highly contestible statements while quoting anecdotal evidence to make his points.
I can't say much about the Vietnam years, but he's putting out duff gen about the post-1980 stuff, either by saying things that are just wrong, or by omission.
An apparent inconsistency in the plan to transfer ownership of helicopters was the decision to retain Chinooks in service with the RAAF, thereby maintaining a division between the Services in the operation of battlefield helicopters.
The Army didn't want the Chinooks - they were already maxed out with what they were getting.
The transfer and expansion of Army Aviation created a number of difficulties, especially in the coordination of logistic support and in the training and retention of Army pilots. Shortages led to a reduction in the availability of Blackhawks, which became most acute during 1995.
Certain Army commanders, in a misguided effort to make it appear things were so much better now the Army was in control of the assets, ignored the maintenance stagger and flew all the Blackhawks into major servicings. Result - lots of aircraft for big '
PR' stunts like company group lifts, then no aircraft.
Army officers often cite instances where, at the end of a day’s training in the field, RAAF pilots would fly to a motel for the night rather than stay in an Army tent.
They well may 'cite instances', but the reality is that from the mid-80's up to the transfer, RAAF helicopter air, maintenance and support crews were deployed in the bush in full support of the Army units they worked for.
However, although helicopters formed a significant force within the RAAF, expertise in helicopter operations tended to become diluted in the RAAF’s broader command structure, with no centralised agency to coordinate the operation of helicopters or develop operational doctrine.
Yes, there were problems with supported Army units tasking their air assets. However, by the mid-80s, RAAF helicopters deployed in support operated effectively and efficiently. There was no great benefit to be gained by transferring ownership of the helicopters at this stage - they were already doing a good job.
The fallacy at the time, I believe, was that if the Army got ownership, the perceived helicopter problems would be over. However, if you have a fixed number of helicopters, they can only work for so many customers at once, no matter who flies them. Also, by service transferring, you force a large disruption in service, loss of corporate knowledge and a massive dip in capability until training claws its way back up.
There's a lot more to contest, but you get the idea.
In summary, I think WGCDR Sharp has produced a paper containing some relevant points, but he's often off track and appears to have been working from pre-conceived ideas and hearsay rather than developing a clear picture from strong evidence.