Re post # 116 by MM4.
'It is not rocket science - and surely someone should have acknowledged the risk (both in financial and not achieving IOC/FOC) when they signed the dotted line.' Hallelujah!
Taxpayers worldwide are entitled to the best affordable military preparedness being maintained with no capability gaps. This means progressive optimisation of hardware in service until it no longer provides 'adequate' capabilities. So, some of you please shed your prejudices re upgrading of existing hardware and consider these facts as examples.
The ADF Iroquois gunship capability was decommissioned mid-2004, a decision driven by Army Aviation and supported by an Air Force Chief now CDF; but Tiger is not yet operational! Better to have some capability than none, and don't dream that the Tiger would be better suited for regional archipelago fire support requirements than a Huey II Bushranger version because they have quite differing capabilities – PNG differs from Afghanistan in climatic characteristics although is comparable in the necessity for higher altitude aircraft performance. I will post an image/document downstream (maybe on another thread) just to illustrate the point so please leave that aspect aside for now.
Similarly for the RAAF B707 tanker which was decommissioned near 2 years back; the MRTT is also not yet proven and will only carry an extra 10 tonnes of fuel offload. Would it not have been far wiser to just lease a few enhanced KC-135 from the USAF instead of acquiring yet more costly unproven hardware?
MM4 more or less gets at the real issue here which is a badly broken Defence organisation. Hardware acquisition worked pretty well pre-1974 when the military managed their own procurement projects with some dedicated public servants embedded in the respective service departments. But now we have the military governed under one ministry and the procurement system controlled by another.
The central plank of defence policy is support of Australian defence industry which is now largely parented by the major arms manufacturers. The DMO/DSTO organisation is presently staffed by around 8,000 public servants and there is an incestuous murky relationship with the arms industry. This situation seems likely to worsen if DMO becomes detached as an independent corporate entity as seems favoured by the major political parties. Note that a former MinDef and an Army CDF were/are directly employed by big corporates providing Tiger, MRH90, LPD hardware.
But back to the central MRH90 theme. If the lessons of war-fighting in previous conflicts are heeded, then amphibious assault and helicopter combat air assault are arguably no longer viable (affordable) concepts of operations. Many nations now seem to be opting for modest size LPD vessels that can be cost-effectively utilised more or less as floating logistic support bases with just a small number of helos embarked and they are better suited for regional archipelago operations. The escort and operating costs for the Canberra class LPD will likely be monumental and scads of unproven MRH90, whether Fleet Air Arm or Army Aviation, will probably be very expensive to operate and maintain. They were an unnecessary purchase announced just before Election 2007 by then Prime Minister John Howard.
The world is facing protracted economic stagnation which should severely impact on defence spending. If small nation Australia continues down its present acquisition path, then I sadly predict that Army Aviation and the Fleet Air Arm will be largely neutered within about 5 years.
Putting wholly-owned Iroquois and Kiowa in reserve storage so at least some capabilities can be cost-effectively resurrected downstream would be responsible defence planning, like what has been happening in the USA for decades. If some among you prefer that not to happen, then you will likely see a lot of Army and Navy aircrew just sitting on arses in crew-rooms for much of their flying career.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 19th Jul 2010 at 01:01.