A more serious discussion can be had about the 80 knot airspeed call during the take off roll. Let me tell you what happens in the simulator. Assume captain PF. Passing 80 knots IAS, the PNF says nothing because he either was distracted looking at something or he simply was dreaming. By the time the PF realises there was no call the airspeed is now 100 knots so the PF calls "100 knots my side". F/O comes to life and says "Sorry 80 knots" Immediate confusion. The captain rejects the take off nearing V1. Was the reject necessary? Not really because if he had checked the ground speed at the same time the IAS passed 80 knots the captain would have known his airspeed indicator was operating normally.
The 80 knot call has become so routine that complacency sets in. And the one time there is a serious discrepancy you can be assured of instant confusion. By the time both pilots discover there is a problem the aircraft is rapidly accelerating to V1. Remember the Boeing advice re rejected take off and that is above 80 knots only reject in case of fire or fire warning, engine failure, predictive windshear and if the aircraft is unsafe or unable to fly.
Checking the expected ground speed reading at the 80 knot call is an excellent safety measure. Easier than checking the standby ASI reading in fact. When in doubt with perceived airspeed differences during the take off run call above 80 knots, a check of the expected ground speed can resolve the differences and if necessary because things happen so quickly, consider falling back on the ground speed reading to plan the rotation. Might be a lot safer than a high speed abort and the ground speed indicator doesn't care if the runway is wet or dry.
A Boeing recommendation is the PNF (or should I say PM!) makes call-outs based upon instrument indications etc The PF should verify and acknowledge. If the PM does not make the required callout, the PF should make it. An incident to an A330 illustrates the point. Unknown to the captain as PM the captain's ASI under-read significantly because of an insect blocking the tube. The F/O was PF. During the take off roll the F/O noticed the captain had not made the 100 knot call. Assuming the captain had forgotten the PF continued the take off and was near VR when the captain called "100 knots". Sensing an airspeed problem the captain took control and rejected the take off at high speed. Hot brakes and tyre deflation due heat then occurred.
If when the PF was passing 100 knots and no call from the PM, the PF had called "110 knots my side" (allowing for acceleration), the ASI discrepancy would have been discovered much earlier. Better still, had the captain noticed his airspeed reading and ground speed reading in the early part of the take off roll were significantly different, the outcome may have been different.