>>>Here's a Chicago Tribune story on AA's recent push to reduce fuel reserves:
>>>An airline feud over how much to fuel - chicagotribune.com
>>>I have to agree with this guy's analysis:
As someone who plans fuel loads all the live long day, I must chime-in here and most respectfully disagree. To me, the academic fellow's comments are the ones actually disturbing because they mirror the fundamental FAR misinterpretations that he as well as the airline itself are operating under--that latter aspect being even more disturbing. [My usual disclaimer: We're discussing a U.S. FAR 121 domestic/flag ruleset here.] [My emphasis.]
First off, one can't have a company policy that's contrary to FARs. If the "analysts" are in essence "planning" fuel loads via historical data, the FARs are still the FARs, and thus controlling. When confronted with the question of whether to comply with a company policy or the FARs, complying with the FARs is always the smart play for any licensed airmen (and in the US, dispatchers are indeed licensed airmen.)
§ 121.533 Responsibility for operational control: Domestic operations.
(a) Each certificate holder conducting domestic operations is responsible for operational control.
(b) The pilot in command and the aircraft dispatcher are jointly responsible for the preflight planning, delay, and dispatch release of a flight in compliance with this chapter and operations specifications.
(c) The aircraft dispatcher is responsible for—
(1) Monitoring the progress of each flight;
(2) Issuing necessary information for the safety of the flight; and
(3) Cancelling or redispatching a flight if, in his opinion or the opinion of the pilot in command, the flight cannot operate or continue to operate safely as planned or released.
(d) Each pilot in command of an aircraft is, during flight time, in command of the aircraft and crew and is responsible for the safety of the passengers, crewmembers, cargo, and airplane.
(e) Each pilot in command has full control and authority in the operation of the aircraft, without limitation, over other crewmembers and their duties during flight time, whether or not he holds valid certificates authorizing him to perform the duties of those crewmembers.
Under 121.533(b), as well as the similarly-worded 121.535(b) for Flag Ops, fuel load planning is something both dispatchers and PICs are jointly responsible for, since it's something that's quite obviously in the "pre-flight" phase. Normally, the dispatcher has all the planning done and the signed (his/hers) dispatch release transmitted to the local station ops, where the PIC gets it. If the PIC disagrees with the fuel amount, they shouldn't sign the dispatch release since doing so constitutes their legal agreement that the flight can be conducted safely, as originally planned. (I love the media coverage of this point, i.e. pilots are being "forced" to fly yada, yada, yada. Nobody's holding a Glock to anyone's head to sign--if you don't agree, don't sign, and call your dispatcher..)
Yes, I know their management sent a 5/24 memo mentioning to go with the dispatcher's fuel loads. That's BS too, as it's also contrary to 121.533(b) and 121.535(b).
The FARs on fuel planning are actually pretty simple. FAR 121.639 is essentially fuel A-B, and alternate (if required), and then the :45 minute reserve.
§ 121.639 Fuel supply: All domestic operations.
No person may dispatch or take off an airplane unless it has enough fuel—
(a) To fly to the airport to which it is dispatched;
(b) Thereafter, to fly to and land at the most distant alternate airport (where required) for the airport to which dispatched; and
(c) Thereafter, to fly for 45 minutes at normal cruising fuel consumption or, for certificate holders who are authorized to conduct day VFR operations in their operations specifications and who are operating nontransport category airplanes type certificated after December 31, 1964, to fly for 30 minutes at normal cruising fuel consumption for day VFR operations.
The various aspects below (especially (b) and (d)) offer the dispatcher and PIC a wide lattitude for planning. Again, these FARs don't mention anything about an airline's "analysts" being involved in the fuel planning--that's strictly the purview of the dispatcher and PIC.
§ 121.647 Factors for computing fuel required.
Each person computing fuel required for the purposes of this subpart shall consider the following:
(a) Wind and other weather conditions forecast.
(b) Anticipated traffic delays.
(c) One instrument approach and possible missed approach at destination.
(d) Any other conditions that may delay landing of the aircraft.
For the purposes of this section, required fuel is in addition to unusable fuel.
All dispatchers want to minimize the weight of the aircraft as far as fuel is concerned, and for the obvious economic savings. That said, any dispatcher worth their salt doesn't like to see diversions, since they're a major PITA for a variety of reasons. It basically comes down to operational threat assessment. Dispatchers watch airports all throughout their shift, and they know where the problems are, what the AARs are, and (via ATC's FSM), they also know when the peaks and valleys of actual airport demand are. Even with those items, there's sill the unknown, and that's again where 121.647(d) comes in.
I'm fortunate to work for an airline that has a diversion rate that's a small fraction of what AAL's is, and our management doesn't MICRO-manage us, and trusts our judgement. If a PIC doesn't like my fuel load, they call, we discuss it, and come to a new mutual agreement. Sometimes it's more; sometimes they go with the original. Most crews are unaware of all the tools available within a dispatch office (since they almost never visit or sit-in), and once aware, they often agree with the original. If not, "the biggest chicken wins" and we go with the more conservation approach. That has limits, of course--if someone wants an alternate and a gazillion pounds of gas that's going to whack payload, we're going to have to "chat", but that's a rarity.
In the linked article, someone from AAL mentions how many minute's worth of fuel aircraft were arriving with. Funny how they don't mention if some of those flights were ones with alternates (and fuel to reach it) that just had the good fortune to not need to divert. That kind of BS can skew the figures, and it can ignore the reality that the fuel was loaded to mitigate the operational threats that sometimes necessitate diversions.
To be fair, it's not all that difficult to see how AAL got themselves into this mess. In a nutshell, they may have had a sweetheart deal for all those MD-80s back in the early 1980s, but they apparently overlooked the fact that the new airframe was powered by the latest variants of the the JT8D--a basic engine design that first saw service nearly 20 years earlier. It shouldn't have come as a surprise that the high-bypass engines on 747s, A300s, 767s, and 757s would eventually be scaled-down and appear elsewhere, the 737-300/-400/-500 being the obvious examples. If AAL had limited their MD-80 buy, and not hitched their wagon to what became (with rising Jet-A prices) such an economically obsolete engine, well, one wonders how much $$$ they would have saved in the last 25-30 years, not to mention today. That's certainly not the total reason for the mess they're in today cost-wise, but you can't help but wonder.
In no event does it justify the nitnoid fuel policies they appear to have. The PICs and dispatchers there already have the regulatory basis and ability to tell the purveyors of their goofy policies to go pound sand, but why they don't is another matter entirely.
Anyone notice that other U.S. Part 121 airlines don't seem to have the problem(s) that AAL does? I don't think it's as much a safety issue (true, it can be, in some cases), but I think it's more of a schedule reliability issue. Looking at their diversion rate (mentioned in the linked article), it's just about double of anybody else.
Last edited by SeniorDispatcher; 18th Jul 2010 at 17:12.