Some of the members signed a letter to the press in January this year. It is clear who drafted it for them as the language is exactly the same as the usual MoD replies. No original thought whatsoever and certainly no idea that the facts they denied were, at the same time, being admitted by other parts of MoD.
In a desperate effort to protect ACAS and others, ACM Dalton also wrote saying that the FADEC software implementation being positively dangerous was known at the time (so wasn’t new evidence). In fact, all he succeeded in doing was admit that MoD knew this. As it was safety critical software, and they did nothing, this amounts to an admission of gross negligence. (We know they did nothing because the AAIB report confirmed the software was still in this original state).
In yet more dissembling, he claimed the status of the software was “factored into operating instructions”. Various inquiries heard witnesses describe those instructions as “incomprehensible”.
One assumes the Dalton Gang (sic) read the reply from fellows of the RAeS and belatedly realised they were ill-advised to admit this negligence. That would perhaps explain the RAF’s latest change of tack – the claim that ACAS (Bagnall) had seemingly delegated his entire authority across (and upwards) to CA and, in fact, the RAF had nothing whatsoever to do with releasing the Mk2 to service.
Another equally dissembling letter, signed by Graydon (CAS at the time) and Alcock (the RAF’s Chief Engineer from 1991-96 – whose reign oversaw the systematic dismantling of the airworthiness system) – oh dear, I won’t go any further. Even a child can see there is a conflict of interest there, with self preservation being their only motive.