Part 5 of 5:
Originally Posted by protectthehornet
… any time you are not performing as expected on takeoff, one might want to check the flap position (including leading edge) and throttles forward...and if that ain't working, what the hell, push the throttles to the stop.
It’s hard to argue with this premise. Of course, that makes sense – but, I would hasten to point out that it makes sense in light of reviewing this particular accident. And, I would remind everyone, that, as it was
not the engine thrust that caused or contributed to the accident, shoving the throttles forward in this particular situation, would
not have changed the outcome. Again, it was heavily overcast and the light conditions were more like dusk. The visibility was between 1500 and 1800 feet. It was snowing. The runway surface was being obliterated by the collecting snow. In this particular situation, it would have been exceptionally difficult to recognize that the airplane “was not performing as expected.”
Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
Though I'd say that (this) incident was probably one of the most fascinating examples of poor CRM (at a company level as well as in the flight deck) I know of.
Again, CRM was a concept that grew out the review of this particular accident. The crew was, to the best of their understanding, managing the resources that were available to them. They relied on others to do the jobs they each were responsible for doing. They were relying on the ground crew to do their jobs. They were relying on ATC to do their jobs. They were relying on what and how they had been trained and what they were expecting.
One other point: the NSTB report indicated the Capt. elected to not use engine anti-ice during ground operations. Actually, if you look at the CVR transcript, during the “after start checklist” challenge and response – as read by the F/O and responded to by the Capt – the challenge “Engine Anti-ice” – is indicated in the CVR as “(Off).” Please note the parentheses around the word, “off.” That is NTSB-speak to indicate the clarity of the CVR was poor enough to not be sure of what the response actually was. Since there are only 2 responses to such a checklist challenge – either “On,” or “Off,” while it is true that the NTSB chose to publish the transcript with “(Off),” it would have been equally as logical and just as defensible to have published, “(On).” There are two switches in the cockpit and three valves in each engine for the functioning of engine anti-ice. When the wreckage was recovered, the condition of the cockpit overhead was such that the switch position for these particular switches was not able to be determined. Of the engine valves (6 of them), 2 were found to be motored closed, 2 were found to be motored open, and 2 were found to be broken and “free-wheeling.”
Additionally, the choice to use or not use the engine anti-ice after engine start, under the conditions that existed at the time, was completely up to the Captain – and either choice was perfectly in alignment with the operating procedures as provided by the Boeing Airplane Flight Manual. The decision to
not use that system was no more
correct and no more
incorrect than a decision to
use that system.