Part 2 of 5:
Originally Posted by Checkboard
As to the Air Florida – take-off power was never set, as the P2 sensors were iced up, giving an erroneous EPR reading. The FO made several comments about the engine indications at the start of the take-off roll, if I recall correctly.
While it is true that the PT2 probes were likely blocked (see the above section of this post) there is nothing in the CVR that indicates either pilot recognized any engine anomaly or any curiosity about the engine indications. Here is a partial transcript of the CVR …
1558:55 LC “Palm ninety taxi into position and hold, be ready for an immediate”
1558:58 RDO2 “Palm ninety position and hold.”
(several entries completing Before TO checklists, Pax announcements, etc.)
1559:24 LC “Palm ninety cleared for takeoff
1559:26 RDO2 “Palm ninety cleared for takeoff”
1559:28 LC “No delay on departure if you will, traffic’s two and half out for the runway”
1559:32 CAM1 “Okay”
1559:32 RDO2 “Okay”
1559:45 CAM1 “Your throttles”
1559:48 CAM (sound of engine spool-up)
1559:51 CAM1 “It’s spooled.”
1559:55 CAM2 “Got ‘em?”
1559:57 CAM1 “Real cold.”
1559:58 CAM2 “God, look at that thing.”
1600:02 CAM2 “That don’t seem right … does it?”
1600:05 CAM2 “Ah, that’s not right.”
1600:07 CAM2 “Well…”
1600:09 CAM1 “Yes it is ... there’s eighty.”
1600:10 CAM2 “Naw, I don’t think that’s right.”
1600:11 E451 “Fourteen fifty-one cleared to land over the lights”
1600:19 CAM2 “Ah … maybe it is…”
1600:21 CAM1 “Hundred and twenty”
1600:23 CAM2 “I don’t know”
1600:31 CAM1 “Vee one.”
1600:33 CAM1 “Easy”
1600:36 LC “Six eight gulf taxi into position and hold … be ready”
1600:37 CAM1 “Vee two”
1600:38 68G “Position and hold six eight gulf”
1600:39 CAM (Sound of stickshaker starts and continues to impact)
As you can see, there was never an indication as to what it was that generated the exchange between the pilots. And, significantly, it seems as though whatever it was that was causing the F/O some consternation wasn’t clear, even to him, as he seems to be vacillating about his concern – and voiced that vacillation almost immediately. Surely it can be seen that whatever it was, certainly was not recognized by the Capt. The conclusion reached by the NTSB regarding “engine anomalies” was a post-accident decision – after reviewing what other situations
could possibly have caused such comments from the F/O (“That don’t seem right … does it?”). Was it the position of the control wheel – perhaps being positioned with a slight “wing down” position when neither pilot was holding it? Was it the column position? Was it the position of the trim indicator? Was it the cabin pressure indication with the advancement of throttles for takeoff? Why was the conclusion reached that it was “engine anomalies?” What anomaly would it have been? My personal opinion, having been involved in many accident investigations and having considerable experience in training and human factors, I think it was the “muscle memory” the F/O recognized – the position of his arm was likely not where he expected it to be with the EPR indication showing takeoff power position. But, because it was something that wasn’t immediately identifiable (like an engine anomaly) he was unable to identify what it was that was making him “concerned.”