PBL, ELAC;
Originally Posted by ELAC
. . . but a significant increase in risk for the small group who fall into the below average ability and below average judgement category. This is the group least likely to be aware when they choose the wrong place to practice a skill which is not up to snuff and needs improvement. You might say, well they shouldn't be there at all, and this would show them up, but the truth is there will always be a small percentage in this category, and the means for finding and improving them should not be the readout of a FOQA event or worse.
FOQA/FDA/FDM flight data analysis programs, where conceived and implemented as serious trending and risk tools where the concepts of "precursors to accidents" is understood by operations/training people, and providing there is appropriate, active, daily engagement with the tools between the safety and operations/training people which means FOQA results are routinely, regularly discussed between these groups and taken seriously as indications of the operation and not either disbelieved or denied and hidden, are capable of extending understanding of this aspect of the operation and can in fact pin-point such operational safety problems very accurately. I have seen this work in flight data analysis.
If SOP or skill-related, it would of course be the responsibility of the operations (standards and training) people to determine how best to resolve issues and certainly precursors highlighted by an active FOQA program would assist any such response. Where insituted, trusted and supported by formal agreement between management and the pilots' representative association, providing such circumstances warrant, the (non-management) pilot association gatekeeper can, by crew contact, almost always with the captain first, enquire as to what happened which provides context for the event. Such contact provides informal means by which change can occur through de-identified feedback to operations and training.
Sometimes, in more serious excursions, training is indicated, even up to a more robust intervention, (off roster pending successful training) depending upon circumstances.
I know that this process works successfully.
PBL states:
Originally Posted by PBL
It is a hard question to answer. A risk analysis is appropriate, but this analysis suffers from considerable uncertainty in many of its parameters.
Precisely. Using any data, even FOQA data, to "plot" risk and "state" that precursors exist is indeed very difficult even if such analysis software has embedded risk analysis tools. While an event or events may be seen in the data, the decision to response, and how to respond, is complex; it can range from a change in SOP to individual training before a return to the roster. FOQA can provide the information upon which such decisions may be made but of course cannot point to the decision itself.
ELAC has highlighted the question of hand-flight very well. For those who always hand-flew, automation is a tool to the point where it can even get in the way of the best operation. For the marginally-skilled who's skill levels have not been sufficiently identified through normal checking processes or formal, (and informal) safety reporting processes, or even through poor or non-existent FOQA monitoring/engagement, automation can mask such a problem until, as ELAC has observed, a serious incident or accident highlights the original problem.
The unfortunate thing is, where implemented at all (beyond a box-tick) and beyond the phenomenon of institutional denial, carriers may view such programs and their necessary infrastructure either as too expensive to support and/or defend at corporate board meetings or too complicated to understand.
Indeed, in my experience, for these exact reasons it has been very difficult to convey such safety information to executives who speak only "market" or "quarterly results" but who control the life-blood of such safety programs.
PJ2