Bearfoil
First off, thanks for the reply.
The Airbus in the conditions imagined for 447 can be a handful. Automatics and FBW are two distinct subjects.
Understood.
I personally believe that this dependence on auto played a very real part in this tragic accident.
Roger.
Even after AP dropout, the ECAM prompts a/c solutions for the computers, not avoidance of, or recovery from, upset.
The manual must be consulted before action?
Evidently, since Pitch and Power as a solution appears on the fourth page.
This got my attention.
It is also foreign to my understanding of flying any sort of aircraft.
Dark, bumpy cockpit, Captain most likely absent or due to relieve, there was no time for sequencing, prioritizing, or effecting control by hand
Could happen to anyone, it's why airline pilots make the big bucks.
Got to fly the bird as best you can.
The Airbus, (this one) has no Artificial Horizon, and Throttle lever position doesn't communicate truthfully the power status.
At the cusp of upset, the computer and its trained for approach to flight does NOT entertain heroic manual efforts, the concept is foreign to the designer and flight support. What it does instead is steadily degrade pursuant to its own timetable and program.
While my gut instinct is to recoil at this concept, my brain tells me that the pilot of the A330 must know his robot, and its habits, inside and out, or the chance of a robot and a human brain working at cross purposes poses some scary ( to me ) problems.
gums is dead on, but his old fashion style (mine also) has no place in this modern cockpit. There is an Artificial Horizon (gyro) available for this model, it is an option and here it was not selected.
Not selected for purchase, or not selected as an option by the crew from a menu of choices? I think you mean the former, did I guess correctly?
I don't accept necessarily that the pitots malfunctioned. In a cell, airspeed can realistically get bizarre; it is in some cases actual airspeed, but not accepted by the flying pilot because it doesn't make sense.
Roger. One reason (among many) to avoid cells wherever one can.
Neither is a three way discrepancy unheard of in wide bodies, each ias being actual, subject to turbulence. Why is the windshear alarm not attracting more attention?
Neither is it known what RTLU fail meant. BEA assures us it meant only that the Rudder was captured by limits provided for >272knots.
Again, thanks for the insight. This thread has been an eye opener.
Change of sub topic for a moment?
For anyone still intersted in search, and a tool referenced a few pages back, MAD.
I don't see MAD as of any use. For airborne use, slant range too great given presumed depth of target, and mass of target.
For a submersible, order of magnitude too slow, and target mass too low, to get a useful signature.
MAD working versus a submarine (consider how much steel/iron is in even a small one) has a few orders of magnitude more signal to try and achieve, but it is the rate of change in mag field that gives useful indications, which is a function of airpseed (or water speed?) of MAD and the size of the target. (Orientation as well, but let's not get too far into the weeds).
Lots of words to say: MAD, not what will find what you are looking for.
I tried to find an F-16 (the assumption was maybe the engine would register if we flew over it) with MAD off the coast of Turkey, in coastal/shallow water, with a reasonably well established datum. Nothing doing. Not a sniff. Was eventually found by other means.