PTH:
1549's pre-selected field was Teterboro, and they worked out relatively quickly that they had neither the height nor the airspeed to make it there. My concern was that you were bashing modern airframes in comparison to your favoured Douglas jets - that's your opinion and you're welcome to it. From the article "The DC-8 That Was Too Young To Die" :
* Replacement of two engine pylons at a cost of $125,000 each, plus repairs to a third.
* Removal, reworking, and corrosion treatment of control surfaces. The left outboard flap was replaced at a cost of $52,500, as well as both inboard flaps, for $21,400.
* Replacement of left landing gear cylinder and bogie for $53,000.
* Replacement of aft galley units at a cost of $100,000.
In addition, all hydraulic units, as well as 90% of the pneumatic and air conditioning systems, were removed and repaired or replaced. All instrument panels were removed and instruments tested. Fuel valves and pumps were removed, fuel tanks were flushed and samples taken to make sure no salt was present.
It really wasn't a case of just dragging her out of the water and being able to use her again, she was pretty badly beat up! Also the situation was different in many more ways:
- In 1968, order books for jets were full, there were no boneyards for easy, cheap replacements as there are now.
- California in November is a very different prospect weather-wise from NYC in February (as I'm sure you're aware, being Bay Area-based yourself) - moving the A320 was a much more difficult operation.
- The A320 touched down in much deeper water, to the extent that she sank completely - far more damage to the cabin and hardware.
- Earlier jets tended to be designed to hold together around the engine pylons, whereas later jets are designed so that the pins shear to prevent a failed engine causing drag in the event of a catastrophic failure in the air. Even then, two engine pylons on the DC-8 needed replacing (see above).
Regarding the ditching plan:
- Airspace around the Hudson in 2008 was considerably busier than airspace around the Bay Area in 1968 - the crew had a major see-and-avoid problem on top of everything else.
- They couldn't trade altitude or airspeed earlier in the glide because they had to clear the George Washington Bridge, which they managed with approx. 900ft to spare.
- Capt. Sullenberger did weigh up the options regarding changing heading for Teterboro and came to the conclusion that landing on the Hudson was safer. He decided this because another major failure, or a miscalculation after changing heading would have left them low and slow over a built-up area.
At the end of the day I'm not trying to get you to say anything, or change your mind - as I said, your opinions are perfectly valid. But it seems to me that the crew of 1549 *did* have the knowledge you're talking about in their heads. Capt. Sullenberger also made the decision very early on that his passengers took priority over the airframe - I happen to agree with him, not least because the economic reality is that the airframe was never likely to fly again even if she'd been pulled from the Hudson nearly pristine.